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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Arrest-Search and Seizure
Defendant was arrested by federal agents in the front room of his
four-room apartment under valid warrants of arrest charging him with
violation of the National Stolen Property Act. While he remained
handcuffed in the living room the arresting officers conducted a meticulous five-hour search of the entire apartment, looking through clothes,
chest and bureau drawers, personal effects, under the carpets, and generally ransacking the home. Near the close of the search, evidence of
violation of the Selective Service Act was discovered in a sealed envelope
taken from a bedroom dresser drawer. There was no search warrant.
Prior to trial for the latter offense, defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence as having been obtained by search violating his rights under
the Fourth Amendment was denied, and objections to the evidence on
trial were overruled.' A divided United States Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction on the grounds that the search was incidental to lawful
arrest and conducted in good faith to find instruments of the crime and
was therefore not unreasonable. 2
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to the people the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." A search and
seizure conducted under authority of a validly executed search warrant
is not unreasonable. 4 Likewise, a search and seizure conducted without
warrant, but as an incident to a lawful arrest is not unreasonable. 5 The
IThe -federal courts are committed to the rule initially announced in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886) that evidence obtained from a person by
unlawful search and seizure is, on proper objection, inadmissible against him in
any criminal proceeding. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Weeks
v. United States,.232 U. S. 383 (1914). Not all-of the states adhere to the federal rule; see Cora, ius, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SrazURE §7, pp. 46-7 (1926).
'Harris v. United States, U. S. -,
67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 1013 (1946). Cancelled checks, thought to have been stolen by Harris and
used to effect a forgery were the object of the search as instruments of the crime.
The Chief Justice, writing for the majority of the court, emphasizes the point that
the thoroughness of the search was not inappropriate for the discovery of such
objects. This was also stressed in the opinion of the lower court, 151 F. 2d
837 (C. C. A. 10th 1945), the conclusion being reached that by its nature and
purpose a search incidental to lawful arrest may be more extensive than that conducted under a valid search warrant.
' Similar or identical provisions are contained in the constitutions of each of
the forty-eight states. They are collected in CORNELIUS, op. cit. supra, note 13,
§2.
' Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 308 (1921).
'Since the constitutional provisions for the security of the person and property
are to be construed liberally to prevent encroachment upon individual rights, the
implication is generally drawn from the Fourth Amendment that ordinarily searches
conducted without the authority of a search warrant are unreasonable. Gouled v.
United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 32

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

extent to which the search and seizure may be carried in the first instance is governed by the terms of the warrant itself. 6 In the latter
the extent of the search is defined by the courts. Generally the police
have the power, upon the making of a lawful arrest, to search without
warrant the pergon of the accused and the place where the arrest is
made for fruits of the crime or instruments by which it was committed
or weapons that might be used to escape custody.7 There is no real
problem regarding the extent to which the arrested person may be
searched-the pockets of the clothing he is wearing may be searched,"
clothing temporarily laid aside, 9 a suit case or bag, whether carried in
the hand'0 or lying nearby." Articles, such as keys, thus seized from
the person have been used to gain access to12the person's automobile or
building, and search thereof held reasonable.
There has been considerable confusion in the courts, however, in
their efforts to determine the extent to which a search of the place of
arrest may be carried, and it is with this problem that the court in the
principal case is concerned. The most common tests devised to define
the "place" of arrest are phrased in such variable language as "the immediate surroundings," "the premises within the prisoners control, or
(1927).

"The most important exception, however, to the necessity for a search

warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to lawful arrest." RorSCHAEFER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 745 (1939). This right has been practiced since early times, People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923),
and has not been affected by constitutional limitations. Not only is it within the
power of the police to search without warrant upon arrest, but ". . . it is also
their duty... ." Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22, 23, 93 N. Y. S. 202 (1905).
'People v. Preuss, 225 Mich. 115, 195 N. W. 684 (1923).
If the arrest is not lawful, then any search following as an incident thereto
is unlawful. Peru v. United States, 4 F. 2d 881 (C. C. A. 8th 1925). Also, the
arrest must precede the search in point of time or at least be ,contemporaneous
with it, United States v. Derman, 66 F. Supp. 511 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) ;. and further, it must usually appear clearly to the court that the entry was sought for
the purpose of arrest, not search. Papani v. United States, 84 F. 2d 160 (C. C. A.
9th 1936) ; United States v. Vleck, 17 F. Supp. 110 (D. C. Neb. 1936).
'People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923).
People v. Manko, 189 N. Y. Supp. 357 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
"0Pena v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. R. 218, 12 S. W. 2d 1015 (1929) ; cf. State v.
Jenkins, 195 N. C. 747, 143 S. E. 538 (1928) (where arrested person refused to
allow search of suitcase, ,officer may detain him until search warrant is obtained).
" Ragland v., Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 598, 265 S. W. 15 (1924); People v.
Ruthenburg, 229 Mich. 315, 202 N. W. 358 (1925).
/
People v. Garrett, 232 Mich. 366, 205 N. W. 95 (1925) an automobile key
2
"In
was seized during search of the arrested person, the auto several blocks away
unlocked and a search thereof held reasonable. Search of a building allowed in
Martin v. United States, 155 F. 2d 503 (C. C. A. 5th 1946) where entry gained
by key taken during search of the owner arrested beside it. A trunk check may
be taken from the person lawfully arrested and used to obtain and search the
trunk. United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908) ; accord,
Dibello v. United States, 19 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 8th 1927) (key taken from bar
in plain view of arresting officers used to gain access to nearby basement). But
cf. State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858 (1924) (search of safety deposit
box without warrant held unreasonable after key to box seized from arrested
person).
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within his possession," or "the area to which his unlawful activities extend"; and in applying them to a multitude of fact situations not wholly
consistent results have been reached. Though "each particular case involving the question of an unreasonable search and seizure must be
determined on its own facts and circumstances,"'-3 what limitations will
be imposed in a given case upon search of the place of arrest depends
in large measure upon where the accused is apprehended; i.e., whether
in an automobile, in his yard, business establishment, or home. Examination of some of the results announced and legal reasoning employed
in these situations will aid in appraising the import of the case under
comment.
Extensive freedom is allowed the arresting officer in the automobile
cases. Thus, as incidental to lawful arrest of a driver, search may be
made inside the car, 14 behind the cushions, 15 in the side pockets, 16 and
in the back compartments,' 7 on the theory that the entire vehicle is in
the driver's possession and control. And this is true even though the
search and seizure have no relation to the offense which prompted the
arrest,18 whether it be speeding, 19 a traffic violation,2 0 or drunkenness. 2 '
As a result of the famous Carrol 2 case, arrest of a driver and search of
" Dibello v. United States, 19 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 8th 1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357 (1931) ("There is no formula
for the determination of reasonableness. Fach case is to be decided on its own
lacts and circumstances").
State v. Hughlett et al., 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923).
Haverstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N. E. 625 (1925).
"o Callahan v. State, 42 Old. Cr. R. 425, 276 Pac. 494 (1929).
17
Thomas v. State, 196 Ind. 234, 146 N. E. 850 (1925).
Haverstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N. E. 625 (1925) ("The fact that
H
articles found on his person or in his immediate possession were being used in the
commission of an offense other than the one for which the arrest was made is
not sufficient cause for excluding evidence of what the search discloses.") ; Toliver
v. State, 133 Miss. 789, 98 So. 342 (1923) ; Note 18 CAIFn. L. REv. 673 (1930).
There is some doubt as to the application of this reasoning where premises other
than automobiles are involved; thus, in United States v. Boyd, 1 F. 2d 1019
(W. D. Wash 1924) where an officer detected odor of smoking opium, was admitted to the house and there seized narcotics, he was not also authorized to
seize liquor; the crime committed in his presence only supplied the function of a
search warrant and authorized a search only for the particular offense. However,
in United States v. Charles, 8 F. 2d 302 (N. D. Cal. 1925) a seizure under similar
circumstances was allowed. Although the problem of the proper subject of
seizure is directly involved in the principal case, it is beyond the scope of the
present note. For other cases see United States v. Seltzer, 5 F. 2d 364 (D. Mass.
1925) (counterfeit stamps seized during search for liquor) ; People v. Harter, 244
Mich. 346, 221 N. W. 302 (1928) (liquor seized while looking through house for
person); People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922) (house
entered to arrest disorderly occupants, liquor in plain view seized).
10 Jameson v. State, 196 Id.
483, 149 N. E. 51 (1925).
Und States v. Jankowski, 28 F. 2d 800 (C. C. A. 2d 1928).
2 Patrick v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 83, 250 S. W. 507 (1923).
As to search
of wagon following arrest for drunkenness see Cole v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky.
543, 257 S. W. 713 (1924); Woods v. State, 37 Okl. Cr. R. 377, 258 Pac. 816
(1927).
2 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925)
(since automobiles, ships,
wagons and other vehicles are easily removed beyond the hand of the law long
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the automobile on public highways is reasonable if the officer has probable cause to believe goods are thereby being illegally transported. In
such case, keys may be taken from the person and used to gain access to
compartments of the car. 23
Where the person is arrested on his own property the right of search
extends a reasonable distance from the place of arrest to include the
land,24 garages, 25 sheds26 and other buildings not used as a dwelling.
Thus, 25 feet has been held a reasonable distance because not beyond
the extent of the offender's unlawful activities ;27 likewise, a barn 100
feet away, since it ". . . was in the immediate vicinity of the place
where the arrest was made." 28 But, under these circumstances the
private dwelling may not be searched, the power of search incidental
to lawful arrest existing as to the home only when the accused is apprehended within it.2 It was so held in the leading case of Agnello v.
United States0 where officers searched Agnello's home shortly after
arresting him in another's house several doors away. The right to
search the dwelling without warrant was similarly denied where def endant was arrested in front of his house,3 1 in his yard,32 in an automobile
driving away from the house,33 at his place of work.3 4 Although there
before a search warrant can be obtained, as to them a different rule from that
relating to the search of the dwelling must be employed) ; see Note 4 TEx. L. REv.
241 (1926) reviewing the rule of the Carroll case in the light of later decisions,
emphasizing its limited scope in supporting search on probable cause.
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33 (1925) ("Belief, however well
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no
justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are
held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause ") ; and
recently, "The law does not permit [a search] merely because there is probable
cause to believe contraband articles may be found on the premises." United States
v. Derman, 66 F. Supp. 511, 513 (S. D. N. Y. 1946). Courts have implied that
probable cause may justify a somewhat more extensive search incident to arrest
than would otherwise be deemed reasonable. State v. Adams, 103 W. Va. 77,
136 S. E. 703 (1927). For additional materials see Corwin, The Supreme Courts
Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. Rlv. 1, 207 (1903)
and Note 10 N, C. LAW Rtv. 79 (1931).
" Thomas v. State, 196 Ind. 234, 146 N: E. 850 (1925).
",Koth v. United States, 16 F. 2d 59 (C. C. A. 9th 1927). Of course, open
fields do not come within the protection of the Fourth Amendment, and so may
be searched without warrant or arrest of owner. Hester v. United States, 265
U. S.
57 (1924).
22 State v. Estes, 151 Wash. 51, 274 Pac. 1053 (1929).
28 State v. Rotolo, 39 Wyo. 181, 270 Pac. 665 (1928).
2T
Shew v. United States, 155 F. 2d 628 (C. C. A. 4th 1946).
-8Kelly v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843, 847 (C. C. A. 8th 1932)
Weeks v. United States. 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
20269 U. S. 20, 33 (1925)

(". . . it has always been assumed that one's house

cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a
lawful arrest therein ....
The search of a private dwelling without a warrant
is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws.").
" Poulos v. United States, 8 F. 2d 120 (C. C. A. 6th 1925) ; Thomas v. State,
27 Old.
Cr. R. 264, 226 Pac. 600 (1924).
22
Fowler v. State, 114 Tex. Cr. R. 69, 22 S. W. 2d 935 (1930)
22
Papani v. United States, 84 F. 2d 160 (C. C. A. 9th 1936).
2' Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. (1914).
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are cases failing to apply this rule in certain situations35 it has long
been the federal law and adhered to by a large majority of the state
courts. 6
There is a sharp division of opinion, most clearly exemplified in the
federal cases, as to how broad an area a search incident to arrest in
one's place of business may cover.

The view that it may go ". .

.

to

the extent that the offender's control and activities likely extend" is expressed in Sayers v. United States,37 where search was allowed in private
rooms across the hall from the place of arrest, the court reasoning,
"....

of a person arrested, every garment and pocket may be searched,

and the same principle authorizes that of a building, generally every
room may be searched."38 Quoting this language with approval, lower
federal courts have upheld searches of the back room in a drugstore
following arrest of the owner in the front portion,39 of the basement to
a soft drink parlor after arrest on the main floor,4° of a proprietor's
living quarters in his hotel after arrest in the lobby,41 and search and
seizure of physician's prescription card file after arrest in his office.4
Representing a contrary view is a statement by Judge Learned Hand
" In Patton v. State, 43 Old. Cr. R. 436, 279 1ac. 694 (1929) where D, upon
approach of officers, fled from the back door of his house and was captured some
20 feet away, search of the home was allowed on grounds the arrest was immanently associated with the house, thus distinguishing the case from Wallace v.
State, 42 Old. Cr. R. 143, 275 Pac. 354 (1929) where D was arrested in the
front yard and search of the dwelling was specifically said to be prohibited. In
State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 Pac. 845, 849 (1927) the court, after stating
the rule allowing a search of the dwelling after arrest therein, said, "In this
instance the defendant was on his way to his place of residence and the fact he
was caught before he reached the place ought not to require the application of a
different rule." This case and the broad language employed in State v. Much, 156
Wash. 403, 287 Pac. 57 (1930) have led the Washington court to some rather
extreme results; State v. Thomas, 183 Wash. 643, 49 P. 2d 28 (1935) (search
of dwelling made before arrest but allowed on grounds seizure took place with
arrest) ; State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 136 P. 2d 165, 141 P. 2d 613 (1943)
(search of dwelling allowed a day after arrest took place in a hospital). But a
vigorous dissent was filed in the latter case, and in City of Tacoma v. Houston,
177 P. 2d 886 (Wash. 1947), the court referred to the language of the Evans case
quoted herein as dictum.
"oSearches of the dwelling have been allowed following an arrest outside the
home where officer enters with the prisoner and at his request. Soderberg v. State,
31 Okl. Cr. R. 88, 237 Pac. 467 (1925) ; State v. Beaupre, 149 Wash. 675, 272 Pac.
26 (1928). The latter case, relying on Evans v. State, supra note 35, probably
goes to an extreme finding little sanction in other courts, inasmuch as the defendant there had been taken to jail before the search commenced. See note 56

infra.
.7 2 F. 2d 146 (C. C. A. 9th 1924).
" Ibid., at page 147. It should be noted that the court found that criminal
activity, extending throughout the premises, was being carried on in officers' pres-

ence, and that the place was evidently open to the public for the sale of illegal
liquor, thereby becoming a place of business and no longer a dwelling for these
purposes.
" United States v. Seltzer, 5 F. 2d 364 (D. Mass. 1925).
" Dibello v. United States, 19 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 8th 1927) (using language
similar to that of Sayers case).
, United States v. Charles, 8 F. 2d 302 (N. D. Cal. 1925).
" United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F. 2d 829 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
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that, "Whatever the casuistry of border cases, it is broadly a totally
different thing to search a man's pockets and use against him what they
contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him once you have gained lawful entry," 43 Apparently approving
this view, the United States Supreme Court has denied the right to
search articles of furniture in an office as incidental to valid arrest made
in the same room, where no conspiracy or illegal activity is being carried
44
on in the officers' presence.
As the courts have consistently proclaimed that one's home is to be
distinguished from other types of premises for these purposes, 45 our
final inquiry is, to what extent then may a search of the dwelling be
conducted in a situation such as the principal case presents, viz., in conjunction with a valid arrest in the dwelling? Clearly, all courts will
concede that it may cover that which is within easy view of the officer
as he takes the person into custody ;40 so that upon lawful entry whiskey
on the table 47 or narcotics hurriedly thrown in an open closet48 may be
seized. And most courts agree that clothing,49 furniture drawers,50
suitcases51 and other possessions in the room 52 are subject to examination. The courts then seem to have gone no further, strictly limiting
the search to the room of arrest or those places to which the officer
must' go to execute the arrest, 53 unless the premises is deemed a place
" United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (C. C. A. 2d 1926).
" In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931) a search

of papers, records, desks, and a safe, following an arrest in defendant's office was
held to be general and exploratory and therefore unreasonable; likewise, a search
of desks, a towel cabinet, wastepaper baskets and papers in United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). Both cases distinguished Marron v. United States, 275
U. S. 192 (1927) (search of room of arrest, adjoining closet, and seizure of papers
allowed on grounds that in that case the criminal enterprise for which the arrest
was made was being carried on in the officer's presence and things seized were
visible and accessible and in the offender's control).
,3 Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946).
"State v. Benson, 91 Mont. 21, 5 P. 2d 223 (1931) ; State v. Laundy, 103 Ore.
443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922).
I"People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922); People v.
Harter, 244 Mich. 346, 221 N. W. 302 (1928).
,8 Gaines v. State, 28 Okl. Cr. R. 353, 230 Pac. 946 (1924).
' 9 Laney v. United States, 294 Fed. 412 (App. D. C. 1923).
50
Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923); Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 244 Ky. 117, 5 S. W. 2d 887 (1928); People v. Cona, 180 Mich. 641,
147 5N.
W. 525 (1914).
1
Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923).
Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22, 23, 93 N. Y. S. 202 (1905) (Police may
search ". . . the person of one lawfully arrested, and also the room . . . in which
he is arrested, and also any other place to which they can get lawful access....").
" Following the language of Smith v. Jerome quoted supra note 52, People v.
Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679 (1923) held a warrant for arrest gave the
officer ". . . lawful access only to that part of the house which it was necessary
to enter in order to serve his warrant. Here, where he was lawfully present, he
could search for evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, but further
he could not go. . . ." Accord, In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 2d 1945)
(1312 hour search of 4 room apartment) ; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 244 Ky. 117,
5 S. W. 2d 887 (1928) (search in hall through which officer passed after making
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If the
of business, or is used to carry on a criminal enterprise.
search is not completed at the time the offender is taken, no return may
be made to the dwelling for that purpose.5"
Against this background, it would appear at first blush that Harris
v. United States has carried the law of search and seizure incidental to
arrest in the home far beyond any bounds heretofore established. But
it is submitted that actually it introduces a new test, viz., that the scope
of this type of search is not to be determined by arbitrary geographical,
physical or time limitations, but by whether or not the search was commensurate with its object and made in good faith. 57 It is not easy to
anticipate what effect the presence of this new test will have on the law
of search and seizure in the United States. In view of past cases one
would be inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Jackson that "The decision
will be taken, in practice, as authority for a search of any home, office
or other premises if a warrant can be obtained for the arrest of any
occupant and the officer chooses to make the arrest on the premises,"58a
for in grasping for the general rather than the specific, one is inclined
to overlook its distinguishing feature, viz., that the ". . . instrumentalities
of the crimes charged in the warrants could easily have been concealed
in any of the four rooms of the apartment," so that in this case, a more
intensive and far reaching search was justified.59 It is hoped that the
case will be taken for that proposition and strictly limited to it, for it
should now be clear that the measure of security afforded by the Fourth
arrest in adjoining room); People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721

(1922) semble, see disseiting opinion; Cornelius, op. cit. supra note 1, page 162.

But cf. State v. One Buick Automobile, 120 Ore. 640, 253 Pac. 366 (1927) (arrest

in home, search connecting garage).
" United States v. 71.41 Ounces Gold, 94 F. 2d 17 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) ; Sayers

v. United States, 2 F. 2d 146 (C. C. A. 9th 1924).

" United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F. 2d 829 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); Picket v.

Marcucci's Liquors, 112 Conn. 169, 151 Ati. 526 (1930) ; State v. Adams, 103 W.
Va. 77, 136 S.E. 703, 704 (1927) ("In cases like this where there is no evidence
before the search of the corpus delicti, we are of opinion that the search should be

confined to the room or portion of the defendant's premises where the arrest is
made.").
mPeople v. Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679 (1923) ; except where goods
seized are too bulky to carry, Davis v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. R. 61, 234 Pac. 787

(1925) ; but then, return must not be unnecessarily delayed, Coffelt v. State, 36 Old.

Cr. R. 365, 254 Pac. 760 (1927).
" Harris v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 1102, 91 L. ed at 1017 (".

.

the

area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be determined by the
fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted
to some other room of the apartment.").

GId. at 1119, 91 L. ed. at 1036 (dissenting opinion).
"'Id.at 1102, 91 L. ed. at 1017 ("Other situations may arise in which the

nature and size of the object sought or the lack of effective control over the
premises on the part of the persons arrested may require that the searches be less

extensive."). This suggestion presents at least two more factors with which the
courts must now contend, along with the already existing maze of generalities, in

deciding each case on its own facts and circumstances, i.e., the size of the object
and the meaning of "effective control"; and contains little to aid the law enforcement officer in understanding the extent of his powers.
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Amendment, one of the most essential safeguards in our Bill of Rights,
depends in large part upon what limitations the courts define and maintain with respect to the right of search without warrant incidental to
lawful arrest. A misunderstanding of the Harriscase may lead to such
an extension of these limitations -as to necessitate a sharp reversal of
policy if the constitutional guarantee is not to be lost.
ERNEST W. MACliEN, JR.

Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-Application of Res Judicata
and Erie v. Tompkins to Achieve Uniformity of
Law Within a State
In 1940, Angel, a citizen of North Carolina, purchased of Bullfngton,
a citizen of Virginia, land situated in Virginia and gave in payment
thereof a series of notes secured by.a purchase money deed of trust.
The contract was made in Virginia, and the notes were payable in Virginia. Angel defaulted, and Bullington, acting upon an acceleration
clause, caused the trustees to sell the land. A deficiency resulted. Bullington sued Angel in a North Carolina superior court to recover the
deficiency. Angel demurred to the cause of action on the basis of the
following statute:
"In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees
under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed of trust
executed after February 6, 1933, or where judgment or decree
is given for the foreclosure of any mortgage executed after February 6, 1933, to secure the balance of the purchase price of real
property, the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes secured
by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust,
or obligation secured by the same."'
The demurrer was overruled and Angel appealed. Bullington challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed,2 holding that the statute precluded the recovery of a
deficiency judgment arising out of purchase money deed of trust. It
said,8 "It will be noted that the limitation created by the statute is upon
the jurisdiction of the court ....
This closes the courts of this State
to one whb seeks a deficiency judgment on a note given for the purchase
price of real property. The statute operates upon the adjective law of
the state, which pertains to the practice and procedure, or legal machinery by which the substantive law is made effective, and not upon the
substantive law itself." It further said, in substance, that the legislature
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36.
2
Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411 (1941).
Id. at 20, 16 S. E. 2d at 412.
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had, within constitutionallimitations, fixed the jurisdiction of the courts
of the state.
Bullington accepted the North Carolina decision at face value, and
went into the federal district court where he obtained his deficiency
judgment.4 Upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the decision
was affirmed 5 on the ground that the state court's interpretation of the
statute was binding on the federal courts, and since the statute was
construed as procedural only, the federal court was not bound to
apply it.
Angel appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that under Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 6 the federal court erred in not applying the
statute. Bullington again questioned the constitutionality of the statute.
.The court held,7 (1) the issue of constitutionality was necessarily decided by the North Carolina court and was therefore res judicata,
(2) under the Erie doctrine the courts below erred in not following the
statute and dismissing the action.
Erie Railroadv. Tompkins in overruling Swift v. Tyson 8 announced
the doctrine that in diversity of citizenship cases, federal courts must
follow the rules of substantive law of the states in which they sit
whether that law is found in state statutes or the decisions of state
courts. More important than the actual doctrine of the Erie case is
the policy which dictated it, i.e., uniformity of result within a particular
9
state regardless of the forum, state or federal, in which suit is brought.
Since the Erie mandate relates to substantive law as opposed to procedural law,10 it is obvious that the distinction between substance and
The policy of uniprocedure has become increasingly important."
formity has undermined the traditional distinctions. Whether a state
law will be considered substantive or procedural for purposes of the Erie
rule no longer depends upon what it, traditionally has been called nor
upon what a state court calls it, but upon what effect it will have on the
outcome of litigation. 12 Regardless of which characterization has been
placed upon them in the past, it is now settled that state rules as to
v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. N. C. 1944).
'Bullington
5
Angel v. Bullington, 150 F. 2d 697 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) ; Notes, 24 N. C. L.
REv. 267 (1946), 13 U. OF CHL L. REv. 195 (1946), 21 IND. L. J. 228 (1946).
304 U. S. 64 (1938).
, 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. 557 (1947).
U. S. Angel v. Bullington, S16 PYet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945) ; Erie Railroad Co. v.
304 U. S. 64, 75 (1938).
Tompkins,
10
' Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938) (federal courts
must search out the entire body of state substantive law).
I Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after
Railroadv. Tompkihs, 34 ILL. L. RPv. 271 (1939-40).
Erie
1
1Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945) ("1... does it [statute
of limitations] significantly affect the result of a litigation ... ?").
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burden of proof,' conflicts of laws, public policy,' statutes of limitation,1 6 and the admission of parol evidence"' must be followed by
the federal courts.' 8
The majority in the instant case said, 19 "For purposes of diversity
jurisdiction a federal court is, 'in effect,' only another court of the
state." Under Swift v. Tyson, this was true insofar as the application
of state statutes bearing upon substantive rights and decisions relating
to regulation of local property was concerned. 20 Under Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins a federal court is "in effect" a state court insofar as the
application of all state law, statutory and decisional, of a substantive
character is concerned. Thus, the rule was not changed by the Eric
case; it merely extended it to cases where state decisional law was in
issue rather than where state statutory law was involved. Guaranty
Trust Co. . York 2 ' held specifically that state statutes of limitation,
although traditionally regarded as affecting the remedy but not the
right, must be followed by the federal courts because they significantly
affect the outcome of litigation. The Bullington case holds specifically
that state statutes which deprive the state courts of jurisdiction, if constitutional,2 2 must be followed by the federal courts. Neither the York
case nor the Bullington case announced a new rule when it was said
that in diversity cases federal courts are courts of the state in which
they sit. They represent an extension of the rule so that today federal
courts are courts of the state in which they sit so far as the application
of state laws which significantly affect the outcome of litigation is concerned, regardless of the traditional characterization of those laws.
It has been settled law that a state court's interpretation of state
statutes is binding upon the federal courts.
What effect does the
" Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939).
" Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
" Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
"6Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
Long v. Morris, 128 F. 2d 653 (C. C. A. 3d 1942).
' 8 Also included are state rule as to proving contributory negligence, Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943); state statute making statutes of limitations
applicable to both law, and equity, Kithcart v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 150 F. 2d 997
(C. C. A. 8th 1945) ; state rule as to forum non conveniens, Weiss v. Routh, 149
F. 2d 193 (C. C. A. 2d 1945). But cf. Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326
U. S. 549 (1945) (forum non conveniens question left open).
- U. S. , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 659, 91 L. Ed. 557, 559 (1947).
20 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 171
(1929); Bucher v.
Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555 (1887) ; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369
(1877) (federal courts are courts of the state to the extent that a state statute
plus consent of parties may create circumstances which will authorize a federal
court to take jurisdiction).
21326 U. S. 99 (1945).
2 See discussion of constitutionality of statute in Note, 24 N. C. L. Rzv. 267
(1946).
"Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 (1926) ; Kansas City Steel Co. v. Arkansas,
269 U. S. 148 (1925) ; Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30 (1923); Quong
Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 255 U, S. 445.(1920) ; Old Colony Trust Co.
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principal case have upon that rule? To be binding upon federal courts,.
the interpretation placed by a state court upon its statutes must comport
with the constitution. 24 In the Bullington case, the constitutionality of
the statute was attacked and necessarily decided by the state court 2 5 If
the statute were unconstitutional, the North Carolina court was not at
26
liberty to apply it, and the federal court not at liberty to follow it.
A state cannot escape its constitutional obligations by withholding jurisdiction from its courts.2 7 But, legislative acts are presumed to be con28
stitutional until constitutionality is determined.
Since the issue of constitutionality was necessarily decided below
and is res judicata unless appealed, and a presumption of constitutionality obtains until a decision on the merits is rendered, bearing in mind
the state court characterized the statute as procedural, it would seem
to follow from a cursory reading of the opinion that the Bullington case
rejects the rule that the state court's interpretation is binding. But, it
must be remembered that in diversity cases federal courts must concern
themselves with uniformity within the state. The court in the instant
case has held iot that the state court's interpretation is- no longer binding but that the effect of the decision is controlling. For purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, in view of the York case, the interpretation of
state statutes by state courts is material only insofar as it effects the outcome of litigation. It would defeat the policy of the Erie case to hold
that the literal interpretation of a state statute is binding upon the federal
courts but the effect thereof is not.
One important effect of the Bullington decision is a change in the
rule that a state cannot by legislation enlarge or diminish federal jurisdiction.29 The practical effect of the decision is without doubt a limitav. Omaha, 230 U. S. 100 (1912); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47
(1910) ; Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555 (1887) ; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 278 (1881) ; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196, 203 (U. S. 1866) ;
Gelpke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1863) ; Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How.

317 (U. S. 1846); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 159 (U. S. 1825) ("This
court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases depending upon the laws of a
particular state, to adopt the construction which the courts of the state have given
to those laws. This course is founded upon the principle, supposed to be universally recognized, that the judicial department of every government . . . is the
appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government ...

The construction given by the courts of the several states to the legislative acts
of those states, is received as true, unless they come in conflict with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
"Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1934) ; Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper,
286 U. S. 145 (1931) ; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152 (U. S. 1825); Mills
v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. 481 (U. S. 1813) ; accord, Home Ins. Co. v. Dik, 281 U. S.

397, 407 (1929).
U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 660, 91 L. Ed. 557, 560 (1947).
.- See cases cited supra note 24.
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1934) ; accord, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U. S. 397, 407 (1929).
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Lupton's Sons v. Auto. Club of America, 225 U. S. 489 (1911);
Traction Co. v. Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239 (1904) ; Chicot County v. Sherwood,
2David

64
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tion on federal diversity jurisdiction resulting from a state statute. The
court recognized this fact when it termed David Lupton's Sons v.Auto.
Club of Americas ° obsolete.31 That case held that a state statute regulating the right of foreign corporations to sue in the state courts was
not binding upon federal courts within that state. The emphasis since
the Erie case being upon the policy of uniformity of result, it would
seem to follow that any state statute significantly affecting the result of
litigation would be followed by the federal courts regardless of the
purpose which the statute was enacted to accomplish.3 2 This conclusion
is strengthened by the fact that the Lupton case was expressly termed
obsolete. The statute considered in the Lupton case did not bar access
to the state courts under any and all circumstances; it merely prescribed
conditions precedent to the privilege of using the state courts. 33 There
was no inherent want of jurisdiction. The statute involved in the instant
case, however, rendered it absolutely impossible to sue in the state courts
for a deficiency arising out of a purchase money mortgage. There is
an inherent want of jurisdiction. Thus, there is a distinction between
the two types of statutes. This distinction could have been pointed
out, and the Lupton case allowed to stand on the theory that the privilege of invoking the aid of the federal courts need not be subject to
the qualifications placed on the privilege by a state. By terming the
Lupton case obsolete, the court made it reasonably clear that it was more
concerned with uniformity of result than with the reasons which motivate a state legislature in enacting such a statute.3 4 If this reasoning is
correct, it follows that the rule that a state cannot by legislation affect
federal diversity jurisdiction is no longer law. At least as between the
parties to the state litigation, the state statute has limited the power of
the federal courts to grant relief.3 5
148 U. S. 529, 534 (1892) ; Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270 (U. S.

1871); Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 18 How. 503 (U. S. 1855); Suydam v.
Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67 (U. S. 1840).
30225 U. S.489 (1911).
- U. S. , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 662, 91 L. Ed. 557, 562 (1947).
"A different attitude is expressed in Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1037, 1040 (1947).
"225 U. S.489, 495 (1911).
"The purpose for which the statute in the instant case was enacted is not
stated by the North Carolina court. Conceivably, it could have been enacted to
relieve court dockets.
" Could the federal court grant relief as between persons not parties to the
state litigation? Assume a case brought in the federal court in the first instance
which -would be barred by the statute if brought in the state court. Res judicata
would not apply, would the Erie rule? That question is foreclosed by the decision
in the instant case. Federal courts, to effect the policy of uniformity, are obliged
to follow state statutes which deprive the state courts of jurisdiction of a particular cause of action, even though the application of such statute results in a
limitation of federal diversity jurisdiction. This rule, applies, however, if the
state statute does not contravene the federal Constitution. (See p. 68 infra). A
determination of the constitutionality of the state statute would be necessary. Had
the state court upheld the federal constitutionality in a prior suit between different
parties, such a ruling would not bind the" federal courts. Federal courts are not
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The court might, however, have reasoned that the Rules of Decision
Act" has always required an application by federal courts of state
statutes affecting substantive rights. Under Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, this statute affects substantive rights because it significantly
affects the outcome of litigation. Consequently, this is not a case of a
state by legislation affecting diversity jurisdiction, but is a case of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This is a theoretical approach inconsistent with reality because in the absence of the
state statute, federal jurisdiction in this case would be unchanged. The
87
state statute determined whether the federal court had jurisdiction.
Res judicata is a general classification which may be subdivided into
two more specific classifications: estoppel by judgment and estoppel by
verdict.38 Estoppel by judgment arises where the second action is between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action. 9
Estoppel by verdict arises when the second suit is upon a different cause
of action but involves issues which have been raised and decided in a
prior suit between the same parties or their privies.4 0 Estoppel by
judgment concludes the parties as to all matters put in issue and all
those which could have been put in issue while estoppel by verdict con41
cludes the parties only as to matters actually decided.
bound by state decisions construing the federal Constitution. Kansas City Steel
Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U. S. 148 (1896); Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S.
112 (1925); Williams v. Arlington Hotel Co., 15 F. 2d 412 (E. D. Ark. 1926);
Eastern Gulf Oil Co. v. Kentucky Tax Comm., 17 F. 2d 394 (E. D. Ky. 1926);
Orr v. Allen, 245 Fed. 486 (S. D. Ohio 1917). If the statute were held constitutional, the Erie rule would apply and uniformity would be effected.

If the statute

were held unconstitutional, the Erie rule would not apply and relief would be
granted. The policy of uniformity would still be accomplished, however, since the
state courts could no longer deny relief on the basis of an unconstitutional statute.
" REv. STAT. §721 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1940).
" Assuming the state statute is constitutional, this reasoning might be used to
countervail the argument that an application of the Erie rule to a state statute
which results in a limitation of diversity jurisdiction, is itself unconstitutional.
Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
8 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876) ; A. B. C. Truck Lines v.
Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946) ; Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38
S. E. 2d 394 (1946) (res judicata relates only to suits on same cause of action;
estoppel by judgment applies where causes are different. This is merely confusion
of terminology) ; Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64 N. E. 2d 450 (1946);

McKimmnon v. Calk, 170 N. C. 54, 86 S. E. 809 (1915) ; McTeer Clothing Co. v.
Hay, 163 N. C. 495, 79 S. E. 955 (1913) ; Weston v. Roper Lumber Co., 162 N. C.
165, 178, 77 S. E. 430 (1913); Brown v. Wheeling & L. E. R. R. Co., 77 Ohio
App; 149, 65 N. E. 2d 912 (1946).
A. B. C. Truck Lines v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946);
Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38 S. E. 2d 349 (1946) ; Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 45
A. 2d 218 (N. H. 1946); Pollock-v. Bowman, 139 N. J. Eq. 47 (Ct. Err. & App.,
1946), 49 A. 2d 40; Milltown v. New Brunswick, 138 N. J. Eq. 552 (Ch. 1946),
49 A. 2d 234; Moore v. Harkins, 179 N. C. 167, 101 S. E. 564 (1919) ; Tuttle v.
Harrill, 85 N. C. 456 (1881).
"0Oklahoma ex rel. Comm'rs v. United States, 155 F. 2d 486 (C. C. A. 10th
1946) ; Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 38 S. E. 2d 394 (1946); Elmhurst v.
Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64 N. E. 2d 450 (1946); Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 45 A. 2d
218 (N. H. 1946) ; Coltrane v. Laughlin, 157 N. C. 282, 72 S. E. 961 (1911).
Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 735 (1946); Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry-
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To say that "for purposes of res judicata,the significance of what a
court says it decides is controlled by the issues that were open for
decision," 4 2 is hardly more than saying that the prior suit concludes the
parties as to all matters which could have been put in issue. And that
is an established rule where estoppel by judgment is applied. In the
instant case, the parties are identical and the cause of action is a "carbon
copy" of the action in the state court.
Since estoppel by judgment concludes the parties not only with respect to the issues actually raised and decided but also as to all matters
which could have been put in issue, it cannot be said that the former
43
It
judgment or decision is the criterion for applying the doctrine.
cannot always be ascertained from a judgment or decision just what
were the questions presented for decision or raised in the case, nor what
might have been raised. Accordingly, it is held that the whole record
may be searched to determine what was decided. 44 Also, that parol
evidence is admissible to ascertain what was decided, i.e., the scope of
the judgment. 45 the effect of a decision may result in concluding an
issue although the decision does not on its face purport to do so. 4 3 "The
value of a plea of former adjudication is not to be determined by the
reasons which the court rendering the former judgment may have given
for doing so." 4 7 The result of the decision is material. Thus, estoppel
by judgment settles all questions which were raised or those that might
have been raised but it settles them in accordance with the entire record
and the effect of the decision. The effect of the North Carolina court's
decision was that the statute was constitutional.
The difficulty in applying res judicata to the Bullington case lies in
dock & Repair, 66 Sup. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1946) ; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1939) ; Oklahoma ex rel. Comm'rs v. United States,
155 F. 2d 486 (C. C. A. 10th 1946) ; In re Mercury Engineering, Inc., 68 F. Sup.
(S. D. Cal. 1946) ; Buchanan v. Gen. Motors, 64 F. Supp. 16 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) ;

Drittel v. Freedman, 60- F. Supp. 999 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd 154 F. 2d 653
(C. C. A. 2d 1946); Jefferson County v. McAdory, 25 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 1946);
Olwell v. Hopkins, 168 P. 2d 972 (Cal. 1946) ; Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672,
38 S. E. 2d 394 (1946); People v. Thompson, 392 Ill. 589, 65 N. E. 2d 362
(1946); Hays v. Sturgill, 302 Ky. 31, 193 S. W. 2d 648 (1946); Sou. Dist.
Co. v. Carraway, 196 N. C. 58, 144 S. E. 535 (1928); Moore v. Harkins, 179
N. C. 167, 101 S. E. 564 (1919) ; Stelges v. Simmons, 170 N. C. 42, 86 S. E. 564
(1919); Tuttle v. Harrill, 85 N. C. 456 (1881); Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 45 A. 2d

218 (N. H. 1946); Pollock y. Bowman, 139 N. f. Eq. 47 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946)
49 A. 2d 40; Jones v. Costlow, 354 Pa. 245, 47 A. 2d 259 (1946).
2
U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 660, 91 L. Ed. 557, 560 (1947).
See Justice Rutledge's dissent, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 669 (1947).

"Drittel v. Freedman, 60 F. Supp. 999 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd, 154 F. 2d
653 (C. C. A. 2d 1946) ; Olwell v. Hopkins, 168 P. 2d 972 (Cal. 1946) ; 2 FaRaMANr, JUDGMENTS §725 (5th ed. 1925).
' Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876); Southerland v. A. C. L.
R. R., 148 N. C. 442, 62 S. E. 517 (1908).
,' Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1939) ; Olwell
v. Hopkins, 168 P. 2d 972 (Cal. 1946); Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64
N. E. 2d 450 (1946).
" Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 64 N. E. 2d 450 (1946).
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the fact that the doctrine has no application where the former decision
was not on the "merits." Is a dismissal for want of jurisdiction a
decision on the "merits"? Ordinarily not. Judgments based upon technicality such as defect of pleading, matters in abatement, nonsuits; dismissals and the like are not on the merits. 48 No substantial rights are
affected. But, in such cases, the effect ordinarily is not to preclude a
litigant from maintaining his action altogether. There is no inherent
defect of jurisdiction. The decision merely tells him he is in the wrong
court of the forum and should seek his relief in another court of the
forum, or cure the technical defect and start over.49 That did not
happen in the case under discussion. Bullington was told he could'not
maintain his action in any court of the state. There was an inherent
defect of jurisdiction. The "merits" of his action were twofold-the
right to maintain this action and the right to prove the deficiency. He
questioned the constitutionality of the statute denying him the right to
maintain his action. The North Carolina decision in effect held the
statute constitutional. That which was res fudicata was the constitutional issue, not whether the state court had jurisdiction.
Tile question remains, why was it necessary to apply both the Erie
rule and res judicata to reach the result desired? Would not either one
have accomplished that end? Assume first that the action arose before
the Erie case, and res judicata was not applied. The result would be
clear. The federal court would have granted relief because (1) the
policy under Swift v. Tyson was uniformity within the federal court
system, (2) the federal courts were not bound to follow state statutes
construed by the state courts as procedural. No constitutional issue
would be involved.,
Assume secondly that the Erie rule is in effect; the case comes before the United States Supreme Court. It holds that the policy of Erie
requires the federal courts in diversity cases to reach the same result
that would be reached in the state courts. The lower courts are reversed. The question immediately arises, may the Erie rule be so
applied as to require a federal court to follow a state court decision
upholding the constitutionality of a state statute if in fact the statute is
deemed by the federal court to violate the United States Constitution?
Thus, under an application of the Erie rule alone, a constitutional issue50
arises which would not arise under our first assumption above. Federal
courts are not obliged to follow state court decisions construing the
,8 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §733 (5th ed. 1925).
,"'Smith v. McNeal, 109 U. S. 426 (1883) ; Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall.
232, 237 (U. S. 1866); Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 156, 161 (U. S. 1840); Johnson
v. Whilden, 166 N. C. 104, 81 S. E. 1057 (1914); Dalton v. Webster, 82 N. C.
279 (1880).
'An application of the Erie rule by the federal courts to an unconstitutional

state statute would itself be unconstitutional. See cases cited supra note 24.
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51

federal Contsitution.
For the purpose of ruling on state statutes
alleged to be in violation of the federal Constitution, the federal courts
are independent of the state courts. Since the obligations imposed by
the United States Constitution extend to all courts, state and federal, a
state statute alleged to be in violation of the federal Constitution could
not be followed by the federal courts in the absence of a ruling on its
constitutionality by those courts. Thus, a disposition of the constitu2
tional issue is necessary before the Erie rule can be applied.5
Assume thirdly that the United States Supreme Court had decided
the case solely on the basis of res judicata and did not invoke the Erie
doctrine. The lower federal courts would have been affirmed for the
following reasons: (1) The constitutionality of the statute being res
judicata it could not be attacked in the federal court; (2) the decision
of the North Carolina Supreme Court that the statute was purely procedural and did not affect the substantive rights of the parties likewise
was res judicata, and hence any claim that the statute was other than
procedural could not be raised in the federal court; and finally, (3) since
the constitutionality of the statute could not be ittacked and since as
between the parties to the litigation it must be deemed to have no effect
on their substantive rights, the federal court must now pass upon those
rights without hindrance of the state statute which has already been
held merely to bar the state courts from giving the relief sought. Bullington, therefore, had res judicata alone been applied, would have obtained in the federal court what he was denied in the state court. The
result would have been the same as under Swift v. Tyson. The policy
of uniformity within the boundaries of the state would have been
defeatedP.
And so we see that without the use of either res judicata or the Erie
doctrine the federal court could have granted relief denied by the state
court. We also see that the use of the Erie doctrine alone does not
require the federal court to follow a state court ruling upholding the
constitutionality of a state statute if in fact it contravenes the federal
Constitution. And lastly we see that an application of res judicata alone
""Where the questions inv6lved arise under the state constitution and laws,
the decisions of its highest tribunal are accepted as controlling. Where the Constitution or laws of .the United States are drawn into question, the courts of the
United State must determine the controversy for themselves." Fuller, C. J., In re
Tyler, 149 U. S.164 (1892). See discussion and cases cited sutpra note 35.
"Furthermore, had the Erie rule alone been applied, it is possible that the
decision would have been accepted as an inferential determination of the constitutionality of the North Carolina statute. Indeed, that is the very manner in

which the United States Supreme Court regarded the North Carolina decision.
" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S.99 (1945) ("The nub of the policy
that underlies Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkinm is that for the same transaction the
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a
state court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result.").
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would have required the federal court to grant relief on the substantive
issue not determined in the state court.
Now let us do as Justice Frankfurter did and combine res judicata
and the Erie doctrine. What is the result? By the use of res judicata
the constitutionality of the state statute as between the parties is settled.
It cannot be attacked in the federal court. By the use of the Erie doctrine the state policy of denying relief is to be followed if the state
statute establishing such policy is constitutional. But the constitutionality question having been determined by the application of res judicata
there is now no problem. The state policy enunciated by a "constitutional" statute is now applied in the federal court.
Hence, we see that the desired end of not allowing Bullington a
recovery in a federal court when he was denied the same in a state
court is attained only by utilizing both the doctrines of the Erie case
and res judicata.
CLAUDE F.

SEILA.

Declaratory Judgment-Trustees' Request for Instructions
The Elders of the First Presbyterian Church of Salisbury as the
trustees under a will probated in 1849, devising a certain plot of land
in Salisbury together with the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)
in trust for the church, came into the Superior Court of Rowan County
under the declaratory judgment act," asking for a declaration that they
had the power "to sell, mortgage, and/or lease" the property in view of
changed conditions. The trust instrument specifically withheld the power
of sale, and provided that if the trustees should fail or neglect to execute
the trust, then the property should go to Davidson College. The trustees
were to keep the property so improved that the rent would provide a
revenue for the church. Plaintiffs alleged the property was on the edge
of the business district in Salisbury and very much in demand by com-

mercial interests, but that they were financially unable to develop and
maintain it adequately. Trial court granted the relief requested. Held:
Reversed and case dismissed. Declaratory judgment inappropriate:
(1) plaintiff should have brought trustees' bill in equity for instructions,
for tle power of sale
(2) apparently the court felt that the request
2
would have invoked a forfeiture of the estate.
It is surprising to find the court refusing a declaratory judgment on
the first ground, for the declaratory action is an outgrowth.and extension
of the trustees' bill in equity for instructions. 3 Thus the court indicates
1

N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§1-253 et seq.
Brandis et al. v. Trustees of Davidson College et al., 227 N. C. 329, 41 S. E.

2d 833 (1947).
'Little v. Thorne, 93 N. C. 69 (1885) (under the equity jurisdiction of the
court, by a trustee's request for instructions, an executor or trustee may apply to
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its unwillingness to entertain the declaratory action merely because an
alternative remedy is available. 4 There has been a considerable amount
of controversy among the various American jurisdictions as to whether
or not the declaratory action should be entertained in such a situation.
The erroneous conception that it should not be0 has arisen in part from
confusion with the policy that a declaratory suit would not be permitted
where a special statutory proceeding has been provided. 7 This miscon8
ception has been cleared up in North Carolina.
The declaratory judgment was meant to be an alternative remedy, 9
to be used, in the court's discretion, either where no remedy existed,10
or where adequate but less appropriate remedies already existed either
at law or in equity." The point of the action is to provide anticipatory
relief without necessity of prior breach of duty. 12

Here the court de-

the court for advice in the management of the trust, but in such case the advice
of the court is given only upon an existing state of facts which calls for some
present action, and not in regard to future conduct upon a certain contingency);
BoaRcHAw, DEcLARATORY JUDGmENTS 144 (2d ed. 1941).
' Contra: Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930) (a specific remedy to enable legatees to obtain legacies without bond was viewed as not so exclusive as to deprive the legatee of the power to seek a declaration to like effect).
Tuscaloosa County v. Shamblin, 233 Ala. 6, 169 So. 2,34 (1936) (declaratory
judgment allowed) ; Lisbon Village District v. Lisbon, 85 N. H. 173, 155 At. 252
(1931) (declaratory judgment refused); Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272
N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. 2d 829 (1936) (declaratory judgment allowed); Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 128 Misc. 232, 218 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1926) (declaratory judgment refused); People's Park & Amusement Ass'n, Inc. v. Anrooney,
100 Wash. Dec. 43, 93 P. 2d 362 (1939) (declaratory judgment refused).
' See Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis. 199, 205, 242 N. W. 570, 572 (1932) ; Schmidt
v. La Salle Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 576, 580, 245 N. W. 702, 703 (1932) ("The
Declaratory judgments Act is an effort to provide a tribunal in which controversies
may be determined which could not otherwise be presented for determination."
[quoted in both cases]).
Compare Poore v, Poore, 201 N. C. 791, 161 S. E. 532 (1931) (declaratory
judgment on validity of will not allowed before admission of will to probate),
with Rountree v. Rountree, 213 N. C. 252, 195 S. E. 784 (1938) (allowed declaratory judgment on will after its admission to probate); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Powell,
217 N. C. 495, 8.S. E. 2d 619 (1940),
8
See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lambeth, 213 N. C. 576, 580, 197 S. E.
179, 181 (1938) ("In Mountain Park Institute v. Lovill, 198 N. C. 642, 645, 153
S. E. 114, 116, citing authorities, it is said: 'It is well settled that an executor upon
whom the will casts the performance of a duty may, when he needs instruction,
bring a suit in equity tq obtain a construction of the will.' In re Estate of Mizzelle,
213 N. C. 367, 368, 196 S. E. 364. Plaintiff further has the right to maintain this
action under chapter 102, sec. 3, Public Laws of 1931, known as the 'Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act.' Rountree v. Rountree, 213 N. C. 252, 195 S. E.
784") ; see Allison v. Sharp, 209 N. C. 477, 481, 184 S. E. 27, 30 (1936) ("While
there was another remedy at law available to them, they have challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which they contend that the registrar refused
them registration. Under such circuinstances and conditions, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act affords a ready means of testing its validity,.
") [italics
supplied].
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-253.
10
1

2

N. C. GEN. STAT. '(1943) §§1-253, 1-254.
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-253.

Borchard, DeclaratoryJudgments, 1939, 9 Bn6oKLYN L. Rzv. 1 (1939) (an address delivered before a meeting of the New York State Bar Association at Saranac
Inn on June 30, 1939, in which Prof. Borchard said: "It has already been noted
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mands the use of the trustees' bill for instructions, which would involve
almost identically the same proceedings, the same issues, and the same
relief. This is not in accord with the authorities 3 and is a reversion
to the holding of the court in the early days of applying the declaratory
judgment act; namely, that such an action would not lie merely because
other remedies, legal or equitable, already existed. 14
The court in refusing the declaratory judgment as being in excess
of the statutory authorization therefor cited one case in support, Tryon
v. Duke Power Co.' 5 The court in that instance gave as its reason for
dismissal the lack of a case or controversy. In the instant case, the
court may have felt that this was in reality an ex parte proceeding and
thus not cognizable under the declaratory judgment act.16 It is submitted that the possibility of forfeiture upon sale, mortgage or lease without judicial sanction, caused the interests of the parties to be sufficiently
adverse to constitute a case or controversy. 7 The trust instrument
expressly prohibits sale and provides for possible forfeiture to the college so that the interests of the church and the college are necessarily in
conflict. The fact of friendship between the parties (the college did
not appeal and was not represented by counsel in the Supreme Court),
cannot be said to vary their legal relations.' 8 And the trustees want to
sell in the immediate future, raising the controversy with the college
now. In Tryon v. Duke Power Co., the court in refusing a declaratory
judgment said, "The statute does not require the court to give a purely
advisory opinion which the parties might, so to speak, put. on ice to be
used if and when occasion might arise." There the petitioners wanted
the decision not for immediate application but rather to know what they
might do if they desired to invoke the judgment in the future. 19
that against a responsible defendant a declaration of his duty serves the same pur-

pose as a coinmand to perform it. Just what motive persuades a plaintiff to seek
the milder relief of declaration rather than the more drastic relief of coercion is
not always apparent. But the simplicity, the friendlier atmosphere, the escape
from technicalities, the narrowing of the issues, the inexpensiveness and the speed
would in most cases account for the election. In California, Michigan and Kentucky, declaratory actions go to the head of the calendar and the new Federal
Rules provide that 'the court may order a speedy hearing of an action foi a
declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar.' [Rule 57]").
13 Borchard, The Next Step Beyond Equity, the Declaratory Action, 13 U. OF
CHi.L. REv. 158 (1946) (it appears that the rule that the declaratory action will

not be allowed where an alternative' remedy, legal or equitable, is available, today
exists only in Indiana).
*'Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38 (1932).
13222

N. C. 200, 22 S. E. 2d 450 (1942).

7 Ibid.; In re Eubanks, 202 N. C. 357, 162 S. E. 769 (1932).
BoRcHAR,, DECLARATORY JUDGM-NTS 927 (2d ed. 1941).
13

Accord, Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Inc. v. Trustees of Wake Forest
et al., 227 N. C. 500, 42 S. E. 2d 910 (1947) (the court had no difficulty in recognizing the existence of a case or controversy between friendly litigants seeking
the same judgment; namely, approval of contract between two groups of charitable
trustees).
"oSee note 15 supra. (At the time of bringing the declaratory action, the plain-
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As to the second ground for refusing a declaratory judgment, namely,
the court's feeling that the trustees' request amounts to an admission
of failure to execute the trust and the invocation of forfeiture, see Middleton v. Rigsbee.0 There, the court authorized the trustees to sell
part of the corpus in spite of specific provisions in the will to the contrary on the ground that if the testator had foreseen the practical situation, he would have permitted the sale in order to preserve the trust
and effectuate its purpose. This has frequently been done in situations
where the court finds such a sale necessary to the preservation of the
trust res.2 ' Although courts hesitate longer in giving the power to
mortgage, that would seem to have no bearing on the decision in this
case, for the court did not consider this aspect of the case, but based its
decision solely on the request for power of sale. True, there is a distinction between the present case and the Middleton case in the forfeiture
provision. There, the parties involved were the life tenant and remaindermen, all of whose interests could best be served by permitting sale
and thus preserving the res. Here, the provision for forfeiture to the
college if the trustees should fail or neglect to execute the trust or to
keep the property productive permits the contention that the interests of
the college would not best be served by granting a power of sale to the
trustees of the church. But this is the very determination for which
the trustees are seeking.
Though the petitioners may admit that they can no longer administer
the trust properly without sale, mortgage or lease, the request itself
cannot constitute a failure of administration. If the court feels that the
terms of the instrument are still binding, it can so decide. The situation
is one for which the declaratory action was specifically designed and
has been used before 22 and since23 in this jurisdiction. The decision
should be confined to its facts and not extended to other situations.
DANIEL

D.

RETCHIN.

tiffs did not contemplate acting in accordance with the decision but only desired
to determine whether they could apply a condemnation feature of a contract
against the defendants if they wanted to do this at any time in the future, but
there was no present'intention of such application, and so no case or controversy).
20 179 N. C. 437, 102 S. E. 780 (1920) ; accord, Cutter v. American Trust Co.,
213 N. C. 686, 197 S.E. 542 (1938); cf. in the Petition of the Equitable Trust
Co., 17 Del. Ch. 21, 147 Atl. 231 (1929) (trust instrument allowing sale of real
estate,

".

. . except the farm called Beauclerc Manor. . . ."

Sale of part of

manor allowed under statute empowering the court to permit sale of property held
in trust unless expressly prohibited by the creator of the trust [commented upon
favorably
Note, 30 COL. L. REv. 136 (1930)]).
1
In thein Petition
of the Equitable Trust Co., supra note 20.
22
N. C. Gm. STAT. (1943) §1-255; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lambeth,
213 N. C. 576, 197 S.E. 179 (1938).
3 See note 18, supra.
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Evidence-Income Tax Returns-Admissibility
In Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.1 the plaintiff claimed damages
to his property and business due to the negligence of defendant. For
purposes of contradicting plaintiff's testimony as to amount of damages,
defendant introduced plaintiff's federal income tax return for the period
during which plaintiff claimed he was damaged, and it was allowed in
2
evidence over objections.
The purpose of this note is a brief investigation of the propriety and
usefulness of income tax returns as evidence, in civil cases, of income,
profit, loss, or other matter reported therein.
Anything that a party has said, if relevant, is admissible against him
as an admission s to be considered by the jury. And the admission by
an employee or agent, acting within the scope of his authority, is admissible against the principal. 4 Declarations by a takpayer on personal
property tax lists are admissible against him on the issue of the value
of the property; though real property valuations for tax purposes are
held not to be admissions, since they are made by an independent third
party.5 It seems logically to follow that a party's declaration in his
income tax return as to his income, or any other matter contained
therein, would be admissible against him as an admission; and this would
follow whether the return is made out by the party himself, or by
someone employed by him for that purpose.( Such an admission would,
of course, not be conclusive, but merely evidence for the consideration
of the jury, and may be explained or shown to have been the result, of
7
mistake.
When it becomes desirable for purposes of impeachment to show
that an opponent's income is less than claimed in his testimony, his
income tax return would seehi generally to be the practical source for
the purpose; except in an unusual instance the party will have minimized
227 N. C. 561, 42 S.E. 2d 905 (1947).
'In this case the plaintiff's income tax return showed that he had reported
therein his income for the period at an even lower figure than he claimed in his
testimony. He objected that the effect of the introduction was to discredit him
in the eyes of the jury as criminally evading the Federal Income Tax Laws. The
court held it competent for the purpose of contradiction of his testimony "since
it is a plain contradiction as to his testimony about his income."
'Stone v. Guion, 222 N. C. 548, 23 S. E. 2d 907 (1943); McDonald v. Carson,
95 N. C. 377 (1886) ; Curlee v. Smith, 91 N. C. 172 (1884); Tredwell v. Graham,
88 N. C. 208 (1883); STANSBtRY, NORTH CAROLINA LAw OF EVIDENCE §167
(1946) ; see also, Kauffman v. Meyberg, 140 P. 2d 210 (Cal. 1943) (income tax
return admitted to contradict party's testimony concerning the items reported
therein).
'WIGIORE, EVIDENCE §1078 (3rd ed. 1940) ; STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§§156, 168, 169.
' Star Manufacturing Co. v. R. R., 222 N. C. 330, 23 S. E. 2d 32 (1942) ; Daniels v. Fowler, 123 N. C. 35, 31 S. E. 598 (1898).
See note 4 supra.
* Cheek v. Lumber Co., 134 N. C. 225, 46 S. E. 488, 47 S. E. 400 (1904);
Eason v. Sutton, 20 N. C. 622 (1839) ; STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §167.
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his income in reporting it for tax purposes, at least to the extent legally
possible. Or when seeking to show that an opponent's income is greater
than claimed in his testimony, even if his income tax return shows an
income less than testified to, it might be advantageous to introduce it
for the purpose of contradicting him, and at the same time to discredit
him in the eyes of the jury as having evaded the income tax laws. Under
authority of the principal case s this purpose is not objectionable so long
as it does contradict the party's testimony. 9
The simplicity of introduction of the one document and the practical
certainty that income will be at the lowest possible figure, or expenses
at the highest, are the obvious advantages in the use of an opponent's
income tax return over the use of his books of account. And in the
case of a party who maintains no accounting records, his income tax
return is of primary importance as admissions of the items contained
therein.
There would seem to be no particular difficulty in obtaining a.copy
of a party's income tax return through the process of a subpoena duces
tecum;1°0 and the return would probably be admissible even though
wrongfully obtained,"1 though such a practice is not here advocated.
Also there may be a possibility of obtaining a certified copy of the
party's state income tax return from the office of the state commissioner
of revenue,' 2 though it seems impossible to obtain in this manner a
copy of his federal income tax return.13
Where a party wishes to introduce his own income tax return in
evidence, he may introduce it to corroborate his testimony as to his
income, or other matter reported ;14 and, in North Carolina at least, it
would not be error if it were admitted even before the party testified. 15
Also he may use the tax return to "refresh his recollection" as to the
matter reported there ;: or he may. introduce the tax return as "recorded
Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 227 N. C. 561, 42 S. E. 2d 905 (1947).
Id.at 566, 42 S. E. 2d at 909. However,- when introduced for such a purpose it seems -open to the objection that its only effect is to excite prejudice. See
STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §80.
'ON. C. GEN. STAr. (1943) §8-89; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §8-90; FED. R.
COv. P., 34.

" Cf. Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513 (1875); Hernandez v. Brookdale Mills,

201 App. Div. 324 (1922); WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2183; the only cases found in
the North Carolina Digest were criminal cases which are adequately reviewed in
State v. Joe McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S.E. 616 (1938); see also STANSBURY,
op. cit. s-upra, note 3, §121. Surely if evidence wrongfully obtained is competent

in criminal
cases, there can be no doubt of its competency in civil cases.
2
1

N. C. GEN.

STAT.

(1943) §8-61; a liberal construction of the statute wvould

be necessary, and it seems at least doubtful that such a construction would be
given; see also, N. C. GFN. STAT, (1943) §105-259.
'26 U. S. C. A. §55.
See STANSBURY, Op. cit. supra, note 3, §51.
State v. Sutton, 225 N. C. 332, 34 S.E. 2d 195 (1945) ; State v. Freeman,
100 N. C. 429, 5 S.E. 921 (1888) ; State v. Twitty, 9 N. C. 449 (1823).
14

STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note'3, §32, and cases there cited.
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past recollection" of the matter reported there when he is unable to
recall to mind the information sought to be elicited.17
Should it become desirable for a party to introduce his own income
tax return as substantive evidence of income, expenses, profit, loss, or
any other matter contained therein, it may be possible to introduce it
as secondary evidence of the contents of the party's "business records."' 8
In such case the burden would be upon the proponent to satisfactorily
account for his failure to produce his books of account themselves. 9
For example, this requirement might be satisfied by showing that. the
regular business records have been lost or destroyed,20 or maybe by
showing that the regular business records are so voluminous as to be
impractical to bring into court or present to the jury;21 or maybe by
showing that a bringing of the records themselves into court would
seriously delay and hamper the operation of the business.2 2 Any of
these seem to be sound and practical reasons for non-production of the
original records, and adequate grounds for admitting the secondary
evidence. Particularly would this seem true when viewed in light of
the fact that the income tax return is made out as much as a matter of
regular business as the ledgers themselves-it is, theoretically at least,
an accurate summary of the business records. However, in the case
of a small business, where the tax return has been prepared by the proponent himself, the opposing party might successfully object to its
introduction on the ground that it may not properly reflect the contents
of the original records because of the incentive to minimize income and
maximize expense when reporting for tax purposes. But this objection
would not be forceful in the case of a large business concern where
the return is generally made up by a disinterested third person whose
only incentive is to be accurate.
In the case of a party who maintains no accounting records, in the
light of the nqodern view as to admissibility of entries made in the
1 See discussion in STAxsBuRY, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§33.
" For discussion of "entries in regular course of business" as an exception to
the rule against hearsay, see WIGMoRE, EviDENC §1517 et seq. (3rd ed. 1940);
STANsBtU,

op. cit. supra, note 3, §155.

" Mahoney-Jones Co. v. Osborne, 189 N. C. 445, 127 S. E. 533 (1925); see

op. cit. supra, note 3, §§190-194 for discussion of "best evidence rule."
Cf. American Potato Co. v. Jenriette Bros Co., 174 N. C. 236, 93 S. E. 795

STANSBURY,
20

(1917); Smith v. R. R., 68 N. C. 107 (1873); Gathings v. Williams, 27 N. C.
487 (1845).
'IIn J. A. Laporte Corp. v. Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corp., 164 Md. 642,
165 Atl. 195, 168 At. 844 (1933), it was intimated that compilations from ponderous
books, even where expressly made up for purposes of the trial, were admissible
without the originals, defendant's protection being "by resort to a previous ex-

amination of the final book entries, or by an account from them."

" Cf. Washington Horse Exch. v. Wilson, 152 N. C. 21, 67 S. E. 35 (1910)
(witness who had examined the voluminous records was permitted to testify as

to the results without bringing the records into court). It seems that a summary
by way of an income tax return, prepared after examination of the business
records, would be equally as competent to show' the contents.
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regular course of business,2 3 the possibility of allowance of his income
tax return into evidence as an "entry in the regular course of business"
seems at least worthy of mention. The fact that the tax return is required by law should not detract from its quality of having been prepared in the regular course of business; but in point of fime, the
business transactions are in such case possibly recorded too late to
qualify as having been made in the regular course of business 24-the
income tax return records transactions as much as a year after their
occurrence.
There is the possibility of an objection against a party seeking to
introduce his own income tax return as substantive evidence on the
grounds that it is "self-serving." 25 This would not be a valid objection,
however, if it has been qualified under some one of the exceptions to
the rule against hearsay; because, unless the evidence is inadmissible
under some hearsay rule, the fact that it is self-serving is not an inde26
pendent ground for objection.
Suppose that it became necessary or desirable to introduce the income tax return of a third party, would it be admissible when relevant?
To avoid exclusion under the rule against hearsay, the requirements of
a declaration against interest (or admission by a predecessor in title,
discussed infra) must be met; i.e., the declarant must be dead, or for
some adequate reason be unavailable as a witness ;27 the fact stated
must have been against the declarantp interest at the time of the declaration, and he must have been conscious at the time that it was against
his interest.28 It would seem logically to follow that any taxable item set
forth in an income tax return would be a declaration against interest
because the declarant would thereby be rendered liable for the tax ;20
2'28 U. S. C. A. §695; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 514 (1942); STANsBuiY, op.
24 One

cit. supra,.note 3, §155.
of the common law requirements for admissibility of business records is
that they should have been made at or near the time of thd transaction. WiGMORE, EvIDEccE §1526. This requirement is also incorporated into the code of
evidence as adopted by the American Law Institute (see MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 514 [1942]),,and into the federal Business Records Act (28 U. S. C. A. §695).
" Farmer v. Associated Professors of Loyola College, 166 Md. 455, 171 At.
361 (1934) (in suit to set aside alleged gifts of bonds, donor's income tax return
held to be a self-serving declaration, and not admissible to prove donor's belief
that shh still owned the bonds; qualification as entry in regular course of business
not argued) ; Clay v. Richardson, 38 S. W. 2d 849 (Texas 1931) (intimated that
plaintiff might not he allowed to introduce income tax return to show loss of
income over objection that it was self-serving; but here primary question was
failure of plaintiff to account satisfactorily for failure to produce his books).
2'STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §140.
27
Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 15 S. E. 2d 279 (1941) ; Roe v. Journegan,
175 N. C. 261, 95 S. E. 495 (1918) ; Jones v. Henry, 84 N. C. 320 (1881) ; Woodhouse v. Simmons, 73 N. C. 30 (1875).
" Roe v. Journegan, 175 N. C. 261, 95 S.E. 495 (1918) ; STANsBURY, op. cit.
mpra, note 3, §147.
"' But see, In re Stratman's Estate, 231 Iowa 480, 1 N. W. 2d 636 (1942)
(complainants own assessment rolls showing money due from defendant held not
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and conversely, any item of expense or loss would not be against interest,
because the declarant's liability for taxes would thereby be lessened.
But such a general conclusion might be upset when applied to the
specific case.30 Suppose, for example, A purchased from B a thriving
resort hotel, and shortly thereafter B dies. In the meantime C has
started operating a rock quarry on the lot adjoining the hotel, and not
caring to mix the noise from the quarry with their afternon tea, practically all of A's clientele have abandoned him. A brings action against
C for damages, and desiring to show his loss of income he offered B's
income tax returns for the past several years. Are they admissible as
declarations against interest? It could be argued that since B had been
rendered liable for taxes by reporting his income in large amounts, that
it was a declaration against his interest. Could it not also be argued
that the large incomes reported enhanced the value of the property in
the eyes of A and enabled B to ask a higher price in the sale to A, so
that it was not against B's interest? The sounder argument would
seem in .favor of a declaration against interest, because it is extremely
unlikely that A relied on the income tax returns of B in arriving at his
decision as to what he would pay for the property; he would, rather,
depend on his inspection of the condition of the building and premises,
and the average number of patrons.
Suppose in the same fact set up, blasting from C's quarry had so
weakened the foundations of the hotel that the walls collapsed, and in
A's suit for damages, C seeks to introduce B's income tax return to
show the actual value of the building after depreciation over the period
of B's ownership. Is it admissible as a declaration against interest?
It could be argued that it is against interest, because by depreciating
the building B thus admitted its lowered value. But it could also be
argued that it is not against interest, because by so depreciating the
building B was able to introduce the depredation expense against his
income and thus reduce liability for income tax. The sounder argument here would seem to be in favor of holding it not against interest,
because the depreciated value of a building is seldom the basis upon
which a purchaser makes his offer. The offer would be based upon the
actual physical condition, so that B would not be declaring against his
interest to report the building at its depreciated value.
to be "admissions against interest" merely because they subjected complainant to
liability for taxes. Note, however, that the assessment rolls were those of a living
person available as a witness, and the exclusion may have been for that reason;
the decision is not clear on the point. Quaere, shouldn't it have been introduced,
as suggested heretofore, as corroborative evidence?).
30 It might conceivably be argued that the payment of taxes is for the mutual
benefit of society, and that, theoretically at least, the taxpayer will benefit from
paying his taxes, and thus declarations in a tax return rendering the declarant
liable for taxes could never be against his interest. However, his honor being
himself a taxpayer, may entertain doubts that are difficult to dispel.
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In evaluating the possibility of admissibility in each particular case,'
there are two important requirements which must not be overlooked; the
proponent of the evidence has the burden of showing that the declaration was in fact against interest, 81 and that the declarant believed it to
be against his interest ;32 both are necessary because, for example, should
the interest of the declarant be erroneously supposed by him to be served
by the statement which he is making, the latter is devoid of probative
force, although as the situation actually exists it is very much against his
pecuniary or proprietary interest. 33
In some rare case the income tax return of a third person (B)
might also be advantageously introduced against that third person's
successor in interest (A) as a "vicarious admission."8 4 The prerequisite
for the introduction of such evidence is a showing of privity between
A and B as successive holders of a title,36 that B made -the statement
while he was holder of the title, and that it could have been used against
B in litigation over his title.8 6 Contrary to the requirements of a "declaration against interest," here there is no need of a showing that the
declarant is dead, or that the declaration was against interest ;3T however,
such an admission is competent only against the successor in interest,
38
and not in his favor.
Civil cases involving the use of income tax returns as evidence seem
to be extremely limited in number, but with the requirement of tax
returns from practically everyone in the United States today, their
statements of their financial positions are thus opened to the possibility
of scrutiny; and it is not improbable that income tax returns will come
into use as evidence more and more.
WALTER E. BROCK, JR.
Insu'auce-Fraud and Materiality of RepresentationsStatutory Construction
The recent case of Carroll v. Carolina Casualty Ivs. Co.' serves to
illustrate the relatively confused interpretations that are found to exist

with respect to the short but sweeping North Carolina insurance statute2
See note 28 supra.
' 2 See note 28 supra.
"Roe v. Journegan, 175 N. C. 261 at 265, 95 S. E. 495 (1918) (quoting with
approval from 2 CHAMBLAYNE ON EVIDENCE §2782 [1913]).
" For discussion of "admissions by predecessors in interest," see STANSBURY,
op. cit. =pra,note 3, §174.
" Satterwhite v. Hicks, 44 N. C. 105 (1852); Guy v. Hall, 7 N. C. 150
(1819).
'* WIMORE, EVIDENCE §1081 (3rd ed. 1940); STANSBURY, Op. cit. supra, note
3, §174, and cases there cited.
"' STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §174.
3

.'Roberts v. Roberts, 82 N. C. 29 (1880).

1227 N. C. 456, 42 S. E. 2d 607 (1947).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §58-30. *
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which provides that "all statements ... in any application for insurance,
or in the policy itself, shall be deemed representations and not warranties, and... unless material or fraudulent, will not prevent a recovery
on the policy."
It should be noted particularly that this statute applies to all statements and to all types of insurance. Other states have somewhat similar
statutes but most are limited to a particular form of insurance or to
the application or negotiation only.3
The statute would appear to be unambiguous but the cases interpreting it do not appear unanimous in two respects at least. The first
problem has to do with the test to be used in determining the materiality
of a statement made by an applicant and the second concerns the necessity of finding fraud on the part of the applicant in the event the
statement is untrue.
The application of the statute to other circumstances raises additional
problems of interest, but they are beyond the scope of this note, its purpose being only to investigate the position of the North Carolina Su4
preme Court as to the above two points.
In the principal case the applicant for hospital insurance, in answer
to a specific question on the point, incorrectly asserted that his wife did
not have hernia. The feme plaintiff was later hospitalized for an
appendectomy and the hernia was incidentally repaired at the same time,
but there was no evidence that the hernia was a contributing factor to
the initial hospitalization.. The defendant insurer refused payment of
the hospital expenses on the ground that the untrue statement was of
such importance that had the truth been known the policy would not
have been issued.
The jury determined that the statement by the insured was not made
with intent to deceive and that it did not materially affect acceptance of
the risk by the insurer. Recovery was, therefore, allowed. On appeal,
the verdict for plaintiff was not disturbed.
In searching for a test for determining the materiality of a representation the North Carolina Supreme Court has used several approaches,
and the divergence of the theories is sometimes noticeably apparent. In
the principal case the court says, "the general rule is that the materiality
of the representation depends on whether it was such as would naturally
and reasonably have influented the insurance company with respect to
PArTmsoN, ESsENTIALS OF INSuRAKCE LAW §§72-74 (1st ed. 1935) ; 26 states
have similar statutes applying to life, accident, or health -insurance. North Carolina one of fewv extending this to all types.
'Effect on continuing warranties, conditions precedent, concealment, etc. See
PArrsoN, op. cit. supra, note 3, §72, for seven basic factors to be considered in
determing the applicability and scope of this type statute.
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the contract or risk." Numerous decisions have used similar language
in describing the test sought for.5
The rule as stated raises considerable doubt as to whether an objective or a subjective test is intended. The classic phrase "naturally
and reasonably" suggests an objective standard, of course. This would
be in agreement with most jurisdictions which have enacted statutes
directed toward similar ends.6 But some doubt is cast on this conclusion
by the next phrase pertaining to influencing "the insurance company,"
which would seem to indicate that perhaps a subjective test is intended,
i.e., would this particular insurance company have accepted the risk had
the true facts been known at the time. 7 This interpretation is further
strengthened by statements explaining similar definitions in other cases,
as in Schas v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.8 where it was said that the misrepresentation need not have contributed to the loss or damage suffered,
but whether or not it was material depends upon whether the applicant's
answer "would have influenced the company in deciding for itself, and
in its own interest, the important question of accepting the risk, and
what rate of premium should be charged." Such explanations suggest
that the practices of the particular company may be the determining
factors to be considered by North Carolina juries.9
A somewhat different approach to the problem of materiality is frequently noticed in the innumerable cases interpreting and applying this
statute. It is found in the North Carolina decisions as well as in those
of the federal courts, apparently originating in its present form in this
state in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leaksville Woolen Mills' ° and seems
to have been appropriated from the Supreme Court of the United
States." The test as laid down in the Leaksville case and subsequently
rE.g., Wells v. Jefferson Stand. Life Ins. Co., 211 N. C. 427, 429, 190 S. E.
744, 745 (1937); Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Box Co., 185 N. C. 543, 546, 117
S. E. 785, 786 (1923) ; Schas v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 166 N. C. 55, 58, 81 S. E.
1014, 1015 (1914) ; Alexander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 N. C. 536, 538,
64 S. E. 432, 433 (1909) ; Bryant v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 N. C. 181,
184, 60 S.E. 983, 985 (1908) ; Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C. 589, 593, 53 S.E.

354, 356 (1906).
' The text writers do not seem to advocate any particular form of test. See
VANcE, INSURA cE §382 (2d ed. 1930) describing the test in words similar to
those used by the court in the principal case; PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW §82 (1st ed. 1935) suggesting what appears to be a hybrid test, as,
"the fairest solution ... maintain individual standard as the ultimate test, allowing
the insurer to produce proof of its own standard and claimant to refute . . . by
... proof of practices of other insurers ... for showing ... this insurer arbitrary
and exceptional."
'If the standard enunciated in the charge was truly subjective, the court, on
appeal, even though it preferred an objective test for materiality, might be disinclined to disapprove, since a subjective standard is most favorable to the insurer
and thus cannot be said to be prejudicial to him.
8166 N. C. 55, 81 S. E. 1014 (1914).
o Particularly is this indicated by opinions which approve charges capitalizing
the words, as, "The Insurance Company."
10172 N. C. 534, 90 S. E. 574 (196).
" Jeffries v. Economical Life Ins. Co., 22 Wall. 47 (U. S. 1875).
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approved many times is essentially subjective and is to the effect that
the determination of the materiality of representations is not always
open to dispute and that it is only necessary to look to the policy or to
the application for the answer, for when the representation is in the
form of a written answer to a written question it is deemed to be made
material by the acts of the parties to the contract. In other words,
the mere fact that the question was asked by the insurer and answered
by the insured is said to be a conclusive indication of materiality.12 The
answer then must be true or recovery will be denied. In these cases
materiality is found by the court as a matter of law, the only thing
remaining for the jury to determine is whether the statement was false.
At first glance, this approach, which may be termed the "written
question-written answer: therefore material" doctrine, would seem to
be a considerable departure from the rule of the principal case. Indeed,
if carried to its logical conclusion an opposite result would be warranted
in the principal case. However, an analysis of the various cases using
this approach shows that, although the court supports its conclusion by
reference to the "written question-written answer" doctrine, the facts are
of such a nature that the result would be the same by the objective,
subjective, or any other reasonable standard.' 3 Reasonable men could
not differ on the question. It therefore seems unnecessary to fear that
any such sweeping rule will ever be adopted to apply to any and all statements made by the insured, else insurance law in this state would be
reverting to the mechafiical standards applied by the common law. The
North Carolina Supreme Court is not unaware of the purpose of the
" In effect, such an approach seems to defeat the purpose of the statute completely, for, instead of all statements becoming representations, the reverse is made
the result and all statements assume the legal effect of common law warranties
merely because the insurer chose to demand a written answer to a written question.

The Jeffries case, supra note 11, would appear to be poor authority for the proposition since no comparable statute was involved there and the court merely applied
the common law rule of warranties, which is the very rule intended to be abrogated by N. C. GmN. STAT. (1943) §58-30. See Note, 131 A. L. R. 617, 625
(1941).

"E.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leaksville Woolen Mills, 172 N. C. 534, 90
S. E. 574 (1916) (applicant stated "no operation since childhood" when actually
he had undergone several of a serious nature) ; Petty v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 212 N. C. 157, 193 S. E. 228 (1937) (declaration of good health, but actually
under treatment for duodenal ulcer from which he later died) ; Washington Life
Ins. Co. v. Box Co., 185 N. C. 543, 117 S.E. 785 (1923) (knowingly denied any
spitting of blood, but later died of tuberculosis) ; Alexander v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 150 N. C. 536, 64 S. E. 432 (1909) (untrue assertion that applicant
was not under treatment for a kidney disease) ; Bryant v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 147 N. C. 181, 60 S.E. 983 (1908) (denial of physician's care for two preceding years, although being treated for consumption) ; Jeffress v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 74 F. 2d 874 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) (non-disclosure of treatment for hookworm and secondary anemia); Dudgeon v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n,
70 F. 2d 49 (C. C. A. 4th 1934) (claim of temperate habits and no prior refusal
of insurance, the reverse being true) ; Fountain & Herrington, Inc. v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 55 F. 2d 120 (C. C. A. 4th 1932) (claim of good health although recently
advised of necessity for appendectomy).
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This conclusion is borne out by another group of cases where,

although written answers are given to written questions, the court rules
as a matter of law that the statements are immaterial. Here also,
reasonable men could not differ on the inferences from the facts concerned, as an analysis of each case will show.',
It can therefore be said that our court is somewhere near the middle
of the road, treating the question of materiality as any other question
of fact, or mixed law and fact; submitting it to the jury when doubtful,
otherwise ruling it material or immaterial as a matter of law,' 6 even
though sometimes utilizing the anomalous "written question-written
answer" doctrine. Although, as pointed out above, when the issue of
materiality is left to the jury the standard to be applied is doubtful, the
tenor of, the decisions seems to indicate that the court, in furthering
the purpose of the statute, would approve an objective standard when
materiality depends upon some practice peculiar to the particular insurer.
As to the necessity of finding fraud on the part of the applicant, the
statute clearly says that to prevent a recovery, the misrepresentation
must be "material or fraudulent" and this plain meaning is generally
followed by the court, to the extent of holding that if materiality is
found no fraud need be present. Typical of this is Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Ashby 7 where it is said that "if the representation
is false it need not be fraudulently made to invalidate the policy ...
The misrepresentation of a material fact . . . avoids the policy even
though the assured be innocent of an intent to wrongfully induce the
assurer to act. ..."
No recent case has been found where a fraudulent immaterial representation alone has been sufficient to prevent recovery on the policy. It
is submitted that this is as it should be, for the purpose of the statute
would seem to be to relieve the harshness of the common law doctrine
which was uncompromising in its demand for literal compliance with all
warranties in insurance policies.' 8 Yet by the use of the word "or" in
the statute, it would appear that even an immaterial misrepresentation,
if fraudulently made, would be fatal to the rights of the insured. This
" Cottingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 168 N. C. 259, 261, 84 S. E.
274, 275 (1915) ("prevent insurance companies from escaping the payment of
honest losses upon technicalities and strict construction of contracts").
"E.g., Wells v. Jefferson Stand. Life Ins. Co., 211 N. C. 427, 190 S. E. 744
(1937) (non-disclosure of temporary indisposition); Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N. C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934) (failure to disclose treatment of
temporary disorder, but revealing treatment of more serious nature) ; Howell v.
American National Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 212, 126 S. E. 603 (1925) (false statement that beneficiary was applicant's daughter).
" Howell v. American National Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 212, 214, 126 S. E. 603,
605 17215
(1925).N. C. 280,
1 S.E. 2d 830 (1939).
1 See note 14 supra.
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would prejudice the insured more than would the common law rule. 19
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a case 20 construing a similar statute,21
decides that surely the legislature did not intend to vnake the insurer's
liability any less.
For all practical purposes then, the words, "or fraudulent," can be
considered surplusage. Yet in one recent case 2 our court, in its effort
to equalize the relative positions of insurer and insured, appears to have
interpreted this statute as requiring the insurer to prove fraud on the
part of the applicant, even though the misrepresentation was clearly
material to the risk, contributed to the loss, and induced the insurer to
undertake a risk otherwise unacceptable. In this action to cancel the policy the court referred to N. C. GEx. STAT. (1943) §58-30, seized upon the
lack of fraud, and refused to allow a cancellation. At first glance this
decision would appear to give some meaning to the word "fraudulent"
in the statute, for a literal interpretation would indicate that the misrepresentation must be both material and fraudulent rather than material or fraudulent, but it should be pointed out that the decision was not
rested solely upon the statute in question. Reliance also was placed
upon a companion statute2 which bars relief, in the absence of fraud,
when no physical examination is required. The peculiar circumstances
of the case 24 and the applicability of this companion statute probably
explain the apparent reliance on the word "fraudulent" and indicates
that the departure from the usual interpretation of the statute is less
real than apparent. At any rate, this approach should not be unduly extended for such a position not only flaunts the plain wording of the
statute, but fortifies the position of the insured to such an extent that a
recovery on a policy would seldom be refused, for most untrue statements are inadvertant rather than fraudulent. The scales would be
tipped too far in favor of the insured, who, under the common law, was
in much the weaker position.
The North Carolina statute can thus be said to affect the common
law as little as any comparable enactment. In short, the net effect is
only to convert statements which by the common law might have been
called warranties (and thereby subject to rigid compliance), into repre1

VANCE, IxSuRANcE §395, n. 78 (2d ed. 1930) ("Most common law decisions
under the doctrine of representations refused to avoid a policy for any immaterial
misrepresentations.").
20

Johnson v. National Life Ins. Co., 123 Minn. 453, 457, 144 N. W. 218, 220

(1913).
21 MINN. GEN. STAT. (1913)
§3300.
22 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 208 N. C. 22, 179 S. E. 2 (1935).
"N. C. GEzN. STAT. (1943)

§58-200.

Applicant consulted many doctors because of dizziness some years prior to
issuance of policy. Diagnosis of disease was creeping paralysis which was incurable so doctors decided not to inform applicant who thus stated "no diseases
last 10 years" and failed to disclose fact of consultation.
24
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sentations. The common law of representations remains relatively unchanged. Materiality of representations has always been a prerequisite
for cancellation of a policy of insurance or for prevention of recovery
by the insured. Fraudulent, but immaterial, representations have never
been considered by the common law, or under modem statutes, as warranting an avoidance of a policy of insurance. Further relaxation of
the common law, then, must come in the standard selected and applied
by the court for determining the materiality of the incorrect statement
being contested. The "written question-written pmswer" doctrine certainly will do nothing toward furthering the purpose of the statute and
it is hoped that this proposition will not again be heard, but that the
North Carolina Supreme Court will in the future adopt some form of
objective standard.
JOSEPH C. MooRE, JR.
Judgments-Opening Default Judgment for Neglect of AttorneyDiscretionary Power in Trial Judge
The plaintiff sued in claim and delivery for the recovery of an automobile and had judgment by default for want of an answer. When
execution issued defendant appeared and moved that the judgment be
set aside for excusable neglect. The clerk allowed the motion and the
plaintiff appealed to the judge of the superior court who affirmed the
order vacating the judgment upon the following findings of fact: summons was duly served on defendant together with an order extending
the time to file complaint (G. S. §1-121) whereupon she employed an
attorney who mistakenly advised her that the plaintiff could not proceed until additional papers were served on her, and that he would
request the clerk to notify him of the filing of the complaint, and
would inform her when it became necessary for her to answer; the
attorney then became seriously ill and was unable to attend to the duties
of his office, as a result of which no further action was taken and the
default judgment was entered; the defendant was unacquainted with
court procedure and had not herself been negligent; she had a meritorious defense to the cause as an innocent purchaser for value. The
Superior Court ruled, therefore, that the default was occasioned by the
negligence of the attorney and that the same was not imputable to the
defendant who was without fault. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court. Held- order vacating the judgment affirmed.' Since the failure
to answer was not wholly due to the attorney's erroneous belief that
additional papers2 would have to be served on the defendant, the major'Rierson v. York, 227 N. C. 575, 42 S. E. 2d 902 (1947).
The complaint. Record, p. 22.
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ity ruled that the judge in the exercise of a sound discretion was authorized to set the judgment aside.s
The statute under which relief from the judgment was allowed reads
in part as follows: "The judge shall upon such terms as may be,just,
at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a
judgment, order, verdict or other proceeding taken against him through
his mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect. .... 4
In its application, North Carolina at an early date recognized a distinction between the negligence of the litigant and that of his attorney,
and ruled that the negligence of the latter, whether excusable or not,
would not be imputed to the former so as to bar relief.r" The movant's
attorney, however, must be one licensed to practice in this state,6 and
his negligence on which the prayer for relief is predicated must have
been some failure in the performance of professional duties7 which
occurred prior to and was the cause" of the judgment sought to be
9
vacated. And the movant himself must be without fault.
The rule of non-imputation is a departure from the general doctrine
of agency which holds the principal responsible for the acts of his agent,
and represents the minority' 0 rule in the construction of statutes substantially the same as that above,"' the majority holding that negligence
of an attorney is ground for setting a judgment aside only when excusable.' 2 In view of its general acceptance, it would seem that little
Chief Justice Stacy dissented without opinion.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-220.
Griel v. Vernon, 65 N. C. 76 (1871) (attorney's neglect to file a plea is a
surprise on the client whose failure to examine the record to ascertain that it had
been filed, is an excusable neglect) ; Meece v. Commercial Credit Co., 201 N. C.
139, 159 S. E. 17 (1931); Helderman v. Hartsell Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135
S. E. 627 (1926); Grandy v. Carolina Products Co., 175 N. C. 511, 95 S.E. 914
(1918) ; Schiele v. North State Fire Ins. Co., 171 N. C. 426, 88 S.E. -764 (1916).
'Manning v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S.E. 936 (1898); see
Harrell
v. Welstead et al., 206 N. C. 817, 820, 175 S.E. 283, 286 (1934).
7
Manning v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S.E. 936 (1898) ; Seawell
v. Parsons Lumber Co., 172 N. C. 320, 90 S. E. 241 (1916) (in the performance
of non-professional acts the attorney is an ordinary agent whose negligence is
attributable to his principal).
'Dail v. Hawkins, 211 N. C. 283, 189 S. E. 774 (1937) (by implicatioh);
.Lumber Co. v. Cottingham, 173 N. C. 323, 327, 92 S.E. 9; !1 (1917) ("Excusable
negligence is something which must have occurred at or before the entry of the
judgment, and which caused it to be entered, not matter ex post facto which had
no relation to the action of the court or to anything which transpired before its
rendition;") ; see Bradford v. Coit, 77 N. C. 72, 75 (1877).
'Kerr v. North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 205 N. C. 410, 171 S. E.
367 (1933) ; Abbitt v. Gregory, 195 N. C. 203; 141 S.E. 587 (1928) ; Helderman
v. Hartsell Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135 S.E. 627 (1926) ; Taylor v. Pope, 106
N. C. 267, 11 S.E. 257 (1890) ; Griel v. Vernon, 65 N. C. 76 (1871) ; see Cahoon
v. Brinkley,
176 N. C. 5, 9, 96 S.E. 650, 652 (1918).
"0Accord, Sullivan v. Sullivan, 266 Mass. 228, 165 N. E. 89 (1929); Jensen
v. Backman
et al., 246 App. Div. 741, 283 N. Y. Supp. 862 (2d Dep't 1935).
1
" E.g., CAL. CODE. CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1941)
§473; MoxT. REv. CoDEs
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §9187; N. D. Rxv. CODE (1943) §28-2901; S.C.
CODE (1942) §495; Wis. STAT. (1941) §269.46.
Dep't 1939);
",Stub v. Harrison, 35 Cal. App. 2d 685, 96 P. 2d 979 (-
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need be said in support of the validity of the majority rule. For the
minority, the rationale of the rule against imputation of the attorney's
neglect is well stated in Schiele v. North State Fire Ins. Co.
"And why is not this the wise and just rule and in accordance with the letter and spirit of the statute? The attorney is an
officer of the court, and acts under its direction and control, and
the client employs him because of his learning and skill, to do
something he cannot do for himself, and his fitness for the duty
is certified to by the courts who have licensed him. If so, and
the client has been guilty of no neglect, and a valuable right has
been lost by the failure of the attorney to file an answer, why
should he not be relieved under a statute... which gives authority to the court to relieve a 'party' on account of 'his' surprise,
etc. .... ,11
In 1921, the legislature of Idaho amended 14 a statute' 5 substantially
similar to G. S. 1-220 to require' the trial judge to set aside a judgment
occasioned by the negligent failure of an attorney to file or serve any
paper in the cause as to which his client was without fault, and to enable
the judge in his discretion to require the attorney to pay the costs or
actual expenses of the successful party in the judgment to be set aside
and a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. This provision alleviates an undue hardship on the successful party and avoids penalizing
the unsuccessful party by placing the hardship where it belongs, i.e., on
the attorney lacking a sufficient excuse for his delinquency. It is submitted that adoption of this amendment would promote certainty in the
law as applied to motions for relief on the ground of counsel's negligence, and would make the rule of non-imputation a great deal more
just.
The standard of care required of the litigant in every case is that
which a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows on his important
business. 17 He must show that he has been active and diligent,' 8 and
Romero v. Snyder, 167 Cal. 216, 138 Pac. 1002 (1914) ; Rieckhoff v. Woodhull, 106
Mont. 22, 75 P. 2d 56 (1937); Smith v. Wordeman, 59 S. D. 368, 240 N. W. 325
(1932); Haskins-v. Haskins' Estate, 113 Vt. 466, 35 A. 2d 662 (1944); see 15,
R. C. L. §161; Notes, 34 HARv. L. Rav. 559 (1921); 9 N. C. L. Rav. 91 (1930).
13171 N. C. 426, 432, 88 S. E. 764, 767 (1916).
x' Idaho Sess. Laws 1921, c. 235, §1.
1 IDAHO LAws ANN. (1943)
§5-905.
1" Wagner v. Mower, 41 Idaho, 380, 237 Pac. 118 (1925)
(if the judgment was
occasioned by the attorney's negligence, the judge has no discretion but.must set
it aside).
" Whitaker v. Raines, 226 N. C. 526, 39 S. E. 2d.266 (1946); Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N. C. 208, 34 S. E. 2d 67 (1945) ; Jones-Onslow Land Co. v. Wooten,
177 N. C. 248, 98 S. E. 706 (1919) ; Pierce v. Eller, 167 N. C. 672, 83 S. E. 758
(1914) ; Roberts v. Allman, 106 N. C. 391, 11 S. E. 425 (1890) ; Sluder v. Rollins, 76 N. C. 271 (1877); Elms v. Elms, 72 Cal. App. 2d 508, 164 P. 2d 936
(1946) ("If judgment be entered against a party in his absence before he can be
relieved therefrom he must show that it was the result of a mistake or inadvertance which reasonable care could" not have avoided, a surprise which reason-
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he must have employed counsel.19 It has been held, however, that mere
employment of counsel is not enough,20 that the litigant may not abandon
his case on the employment of counsel, 21 and that when- he has a case
in court, he must attend to it.2 2 These principles have served as the
basis for decision in a number of cases23 wherein the net result was
to impute the causative negligence of the attorney to his client, on the
theory that the latter had not lived up to these requirements. In other
cases, indistinguishable on the facts reported,2 4 the litigant was held not
negligent and the rule of non-imputation applied to permit vacating the
judgment. In the instant case, defendant employed an attorney and
thereafter did nothing more than .make a single telephone inquiry 25
(some thirty days before the default judgment was rendered), regarding the progress of the case. On the basis of previous ruling involving
the question of vacating default judgments the court could have found
precedent for either granting or denying the relief.2 6 The allowance of
relief in this case is in line with the liberal view evidenced in more
27
recent decisions.
It is true that in the case under consideration the dtefendant's attorney erred when he advised his client that the complaint would have to
28
be served on her before the plaintiff could proceed to judgment.
Plaintiff's counsel therefore contended on appeal that the defendant was
able precaution could not have prevented, or a neglect which reasonable prudence
could not have anticipated.").
" Carter v. Anderson, 208 N. C. 529, 181 S. E. 750 (1935) ; Gaster v. Thomas,
188 N. C. 346, 124 S. E. 609 (1924) ; Pierce v. Eller, 167 N. C. 672, 83 S. E. 758
(1914).
"9Holland v. Benevolent Assn., 176 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 150 (1918); Churchill
v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 88 N. C. 205 (1883) ; see Sutherland v. McLean, 199
N. C. 345, 347, 154 S. E. 662, 663 (1930).
" E.g, Hyde County Lumber Co. v. Thomasville Chair Co., 190 N. C. 437,
130 S.E. 12 (1925).
'" E.g., Roberts v. Allman, 106 N. C. 391, 11 S.E. 425 (1890).
,'E.g., Pepper v. Clegg, 132 N. C. 312, 43 S.E. 906 (1903).
" Hyde County Lumber Co. v. Thomasville Chair Co., 190 N. C. 437, 130 S.E.
12 (1925) ; Hardware Co. v. Buhmann et al., 159 N. C. 511, 75 S.E. 731 (1912) ;
Reynolds v. Greensboro Boiler & Machine Co., 153 N. C. 342, 69 S. E. 248 (1910).
2 Gunter v. Dowdy, 224 N. C. 522, 31 S. E. 2d 524 (1944); Meece v. Commercial Credit Co., 201 N. C. 138, 159 S.E. 17 (1931); Helderman v. Hartsell
Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135 S.E. 627 (1926); Gwathney v. Savage, 101 N. C.
103, 7 S.E. 661 (1888) ; English v. English, 87 N. C. 497 (1882).
" Record, p. 22.
28 Compare cases cited note 23 supra with those cited note 24 supra.
27 See Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 451, 38 S. E. 2d 525, 527 (1946);
Gunter v. Dowdy, 224 N. C. 522, 31 S.E. 2d 524 (1944) ; Gosnell v. Hilliard, 205
N. C. 297, 171 S.E. 52 (1933) ; Meece v. Commercial Credit Co., 201 N. C. 139,
159 S.E. 17 (1931) ; Sutherland v. McLean, 199 N. C. 345, 154 S.E. 662 (1930).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-121 (where the plaintiff is given additional
time in which to file complaint, the statute provides that a copy of such order be
served with the summons; plaintiff is required to prepare a copy of the complaint
for the use of defendant and his attorney, but it is then filed with the clerk rather
than being served on defehdant).
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barred from relief, for a mistake of law whether made by the litigant"
or by his attorney3" does not constitute ground for setting a judgment
aside. North Carolina holds with the majority3 l that the statute has
reference to mistakes of fact 3 2 and not of law. But since defendant's
attorney promised to secure a copy of the complaint when filed, 3 and
presumably would have done so had it not been for his illness, there
seemed to be no real reliance on his misapprehension of the law either
by himself or by the defendant. The question of the right of a
litigant to have a judgment set aside on the ground of a mistake of law
made by his attorney was thus not squarely before the court and therefore not decided.3 4
The court in the instant case ruled that motions under the statute
to vacate judgments are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the
trial court, whose ruling thereon can be reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion.3 5 As a general proposition, this agrees with the cases in our
own reports3 6 and those of other jurisdictions.37 But it must be remembered that the existence of a discretionary power depends on whether
the negligence which occasioned the judgment complained of is ex29
Lerch Bros. v. IcKinne Bros., 187 N. C. 419, 122 S. E. 9 (1924) ; Skinner
v. Terry, 107 N. C. 103, 12 S.E. 118 (1890).
"0
Phifer v. Ins. Co., 123 N. C. 405, 31 S. E. 715 (1898).
" Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P. 2d 1053 (1939); Rieckhoff v.
Woodhull, 106 Mont. 22, 75 P. 2d 56 (1937) ; Lucas v. North Carolina Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 184 S.C. 119, 191 S.E. 711 (1937) ; cf. Savage v. Cannon, 204 S.C. 473,
30 S. E. 2d 70 (1944) (where defendant's attorney was mistaken as to the time
allowed for answering, order vacating the default judgment was affirmed). Plano
Manufacturing Co. v. Murphy, 16 S.D. 380, 92 N. W. 1072 (1902); see Note,
153 A. L. R. 449,. 455 (1944); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §238 (5th ed., Tuttle,
1925).
82 1 FREMAN, op. cit. supra, note 31, §241 ("Where the statute enumerates excusable neglect as one of the grounds for vacating a judgment, it seems superfluous
to name any other; for such other grounds as have been named, to wit, mistake,
surprise, inadvertance, unavoidable casualty or misfortune, if they or any of them
exist under circumstances such as erititle the moving party to relief constitute a
case of excusable neglect.") ; see Marsh v. Griffin, 123 N. C. 660, 667, 31 S. E.
840, 842 (1898) for a similar observation. But cf. Mann v. Hall, 163 N. C. 50, 79
S. E. 437 (1913) (relief on the ground of a mistake of fact allowed without consideration of the question of fault in making the mistake, the court holding that
the several gronds for relief specified in the statute are separable and not "mere
surplusage").

8 Record, p. 22.

"Rierson v. York, 227 N. C. 575, 578, 42 S.E. 2d 902, 903 (1947) ("There
was evidence from which the judge might find, and did find, that the neglect was
due to the incapacity of the lawyer induced by serious illness. The larger part of
the court's jurisdiction under this statute is invoked under 'excusable neglect'
where there is neither mistake of law or fact.")..
8 Ibid.
8
Dunn v. Jones, 195 N. C. 354, 142 S. E. 320 (1928); Sikes v. Weatherly,
110 N. C. 131, 14 S. E. 511 (1892); see Garner v. Quakenbush, 187 N. C. 603,
606, 122 S.E. 474, 476 (1924).
"' Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal. 2d 274, 148 P. 2d 611 (1944) ; Drinkard et al. v.
Spencer, 72 Colo. 396, 211 Pac. 379 (1922) ; Atwood v. Northern Pac. R. R., 37
Idaho 554, 217 Pac. 600 (1923); Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C. 473, 30 S.E. 2d
70 (1944) ; Green v. McLoud Co., 87 Vt. 242, 88 Ad. 810 (1913).
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cusable.
And the question of excusability is one of law and therefore
reviewable in every case.3 9 The leading case for this principle-is Norton
v. McLaurti 4° wherein the court outlined the rules governing application of the statute. Upon entry of the motion to set aside, the judge
finds the facts on which it is based, and these findings are conclusive
on appeal when supported by the evidence. From such findings, he
determines whether excusable negligence has been shown. And from
this determination, either party may appeal. If he correctly determines
the negligence is not excusable, that puts an end to the motion. If he
correctly determines the negligence is excusable, then he may in the
exercise of his discretion grant or deny relief, and it is his ruling in this
particular that is reviewable only on a showing of abuse of discretion.
Hence, as might be expected, most of the cases in the reports have
turned on whether the legal ruling below was correct 4' rather than
whether the court had abused its discretion.4 2 The question of an abuse
of discretion thus becomes pertinent only43 where, as in the instant case,
the supreme court decides that the trial court in vacating the judgment
correctly held the negligence to be excusable.
DAVID M. McLLLAND.

Labor-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Union Liability
for Damages Under the Taft-Hartley Act
On June 23, 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act' made labor unions liable
in damages for the breach of collective bargaining agreements 2 and for
injuries resulting from certain "unlawful" strikes and boycotts. 3 In
both types of cases the injured party is provided with unobstructed
M iManning
v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S. E. 963 (1898) ; Stith
v. Jones, 119 N. C. 428, 25 S. E. 1022 (1896); State Bank, Ltd. v. Post Falls
Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 587, 161 Pac. 242 (1916). Movant must also show
that he has a meritorious defense. Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 38 S. E. 2d
525 (1946).
"Marsh v. Griffin, 123 N. C. 660, 31 S. E. 840 (1898); Griel v. Vernon, 65
N. C. 76 (1871) ; FREEMAN, op. cit. supra, note 31, §290 ("This discretion relates
only to the question whether under the particular facts and circumstances disclosed the case is one which merits relief ...
It has no relation to questions of
law which may arise upon the facts, but such questions must, of course, be determined and be subject to review the same as any other matter of law.").
40 125 N. C. 185, 34 S. E. 269 (1899).
"1 Whitaker v. Raines, 226 N. C. 526, 39 S. E. 2d 266 (1946) ; Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N. C. 208, 34 S. E. 2d 67 (1945); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Turner, 202 N. C. 162, 162 S. E. 221 (1931); Sutherland'v. McLean, 199 N. C.
345,"'154 S. E. 662 (1930) ; Warren v. Harvey, 92 N. C. 137 (1885).
Brown v. Hale, 93 N. C. 188 (1885); Kerchner v. Baker, 82 N. C. 169
(1880) ;'Bank of Statesville v. Foote et a1.,77 N. C. 131 (1877).
"No case has been found wherein the trial judge denied the motion to set
aside notwithstanding a legally correct ruling that movant's negligence was
excusable.
1
"Labor Management Act, 1947," 61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. A. §141 (Supp.
1947).
2
Id. §185.
'Id. §187.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

access to the federal courts to enforce his rights, and the union treasury
is subject to execution on the judgment. The person who has been
injured by an "unlawful" strike or boycott has the additional privilege
of seeking his remedy in any other court with jurisdiction over the
parties.
The amenability of unions in state courts has been chaotic. About
one third of the states have statutes making unincorporated associations
suable in their common names, but some of these statutes have been
judicially restricted to include only "business" associations. In states
without statutes on the subject the case law is even more confused.
Some accord unions the common law immunity 4 of unincorporated
associations, others utilize the devices of class suits or "waivable defect"
or estoppel, while a few allow unions to be sued on grounds of policy
and necessity. 5
Whether a collective bargaining agreement be considered a treaty,
or a mutually acceptable list of shop rules, or a common law contract
has also been in a state of confusion.0 Congress considered the divergence among the states as to the status of collective bargaining agreements
and as to the suability of unions to be an interference with collective
bargaining and thereby a burden on interstate commerce. Therefore,
Congress took the next logical step in encouraging collective bargaining.
by recognizing such agreements as binding contracts and opening the
federal courts to insure a remedy.
The minority report of the Senate Committee 7 attacked the constitutionality of the provision conferring upon the federal courts -jurisdiction over suits for breach of contract "without regard to the citizenship
of the parties." Such a suit would have to come within one of two
possible grounds of judicial power as defined and required by the Constitution.9 There must be. either diversity of citizenship, or the suit
must be one "arising under [the] Constftution, [or] the laws of the
United States," that is, it must involve a federal question. Since diversity of citizenship is not a prerequisite under the Taft-Hartley Act, the
sole remaining source of judicial power is that of suits involving a federal question. The minority contended that suits on collective bargain"Hallman v. The Wood, Wire and Metal Lather's International Union, 219
N. C. 798, 15 S. E. 2d 361 (1941) ; Note, Suability of UnincorporatedAssociations
in North Carolina,25 N. C. L. REv. 319 (1947).
'United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344
(1922); Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, 147 F. 2d 865 (App. D. C.

1945) ; see generally: Witmer,

Trade Union

Liability, 51 YALE L. J. 40 (1941);

Note, 33 CAL. L. REV. 444 (1945).
81 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 492 (1940); GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 378 (1946); HARRIS AND Wn.LIAmsoN, TRENDS IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 58 (1945).

" SEN. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947).
861 STAT. , 29 U. S. C. A. §185(a) (Supp. 1947).
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. III §2.
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ing agreements would not meet the requirements of the federal question
type of judicial power in that such suits would involve primarily questions of state law and questions of fact.
The issue will arise when a suit in which the judgment is enforceable
against the union treasury and not against the individual members is
brought by or against a labor union in its common name for damages
on a collective bargaining agreement that Congress has declared binding.
Under such a state of facts, will the suit qualify as one "arising under
[the] Constitution, [or] the laws of the United States" and thereby
invoke the judicial power of the federal courts?
An affirmative answer to the proposition is called for by Osborne
v. The United States Bank in which Chief Justice Marshall said:
"We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power
of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient
of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the
circuit courts jurisdiction of that cAuse, although other questions
of fact or of law may be involved in it.
"When a bank sues, the first question which presents itself, and
which lies at the foundation of the cause is, has this entity a right
to sue?... This depends on a law of the United States.... (This
is an important question, and it exists in every possible case.)" 10
The Act appears to give extraordinary privileges to a party bringing an action. The suit may be brought without regard to either diver109 Wheat. 738, 823 (U. S. 1824). Accord, Davis v. Slocumb, 263 U. S. 158
(1923) ; Tex. & Pac. R. R. v. Kirk, 115 U. S.1 (1885) ; Lucking v. First National
Bank-Detroit, 142 F. 2d 528 (C. C. A. 6th 1944) (distinguished the Gully case) ;
Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckart, 108 F. 2d 51 (C. C. A. 3d 1939) (suit
under the Securities Act which specifically gives district courts "jurisdiction to
enforce liability created by this title!'); Fishman v. Marcourse, 32 F. Supp. 460
(E.D. Pa. 1940) (action under the Fair Labor Standards Act in which the court
disposed of the jurisdictional question by tersely stating that district courts have
jurisdiction of cases under laws regulating commerce) ; McGoon v. Northern Pac.
R. R., 204 Fed. 998 (E. D. N. D. 1913). But cf., Gully v. First National Bank,
299 U. S. 109 (1936) ; Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S.476 (1933) ; Gold
Washing & Water Co v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199 (1877); Costanzo Coal Mining Co.
v. Weirton Steel Co., 150 F. 2d 929 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) ; Burke v. Union Pacific
R. R., 129 F. 2d 844 (C. C. A. 10th 1942) (The last two cases followed the
Gully case literally.).
The author is not unaware of the force and implications of Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in the Gdly case. It is submitted that the Gully. case is distinguish,
able from the Osborne case and inapplicable to suits under the Taft-Hartley Act.
The Gully case interpreted the amount of jurisdiction conferred on the federal
courts by the Act of 1875, 18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1927), but a
suit under the Taft-Hartley Act will not rely on the Act of 1875, because jurisdiction of such suits is expressly conferred upon the federal courts by the TaftHartley Act itself: "Suits for violation of contracts . . . may be brought in any
district court.. .", 29 U. S. C. A. §185(a) (Supp. 1947).
For a complete discussion of "federal question" jurisdiction, see: Forrester,
Federal Question. Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TULANE L. REV. 263 (1943);
Chadbourne and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 639 (1942); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TULANE

L. REV. 362 (1942).
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sity of citizenship or amount in controversy in any United States district
court having jurisdiction of the parties. A district court is deemed to
have jurisdiction of a union either in the district where the union maintains its principal office or in any district in which the authorized agents
of the union are acting for employee members. Service of any legal
process upon an authorized agent is deemed to constitute service on the
labor organization. A money judgment is enforceable against the union
treasury but not the members.
Actually the foregoing are not drastic changes from the prior procedure. Previously federal courts entertained class suits by and against
unions where the requisite diversity of citizenship was present. Theoretically complete diversity of citizenship of all the members had to
exist.11 However, in practice the requisite diversity might readily be
obtained by proper selection of representatives, for only the citizenship
of the representatives need appear.1 2 Furthermore, since suits under the
Act will involve a federal question, it was superfluous to waive the necessity of diversity of citizenship. As to not requiring any specified jurisdictional amount, it should suffice to point out that Congress has not
established a jurisdictional amourt for many types of suits. 18
Since the Coronadocase 14 and later by virtue of Federal Rule 17(b),
suits to enforce a federal right have been brought in the common name
of the unincorporated association. In passing, it is interesting to notice
that Mr. Padway, the late general counsel of A. F. of L., testified at a
hearing of the Judiciary Committee18 which adopted the above Federal
Rule, to the effect that unions no longer feared being sued in their common name, "because we, too, have to sue . . . to obtain our rights."
When a judgment is recovered in a suit against an unincorporated association in its common name, the common property is subject to execution.'6 The Taft-Hartley Act insures against a recurrence similar to
the Danbury Hatters Casey1 where individual members of the union
had their houses sold at execution to pay 'the judgment, by exempting
the property of the individual members from the judgment. Such a
limited liability of union members is similar to that enjoyed by stockholders of a corporation-a natural corollary of allowing the unions to
be sued as an entity.
Service of process under the Act seems slightly more liberal than
"

2 Mooazs FEDERAL PRAcTicE 2100 (1938).
International Allied Printing Trades Ass'n. v. Master Printers Union of

N. J., 34 F. Supp. 178 (D. N. J. 1940).
1325 STAT. 433 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41 (1927).
14
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344
(1922).
Hearings before the Judiciary Committee on H. R. 8892, serial 17,
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
1 1 MoopE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE 314 (1938).
"1Loewe v. Lawlor, 235 U. S. 522 (1914).
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under the Federal Rules. The latter apparently requires valid service
to be on a "process agent" by appointment or by law,' 8 whereas under
the Act any agent is sufficient. The provision with regard to the districts
in which suits may be brought is fortunately uneqaivocal, 19 for, in the
absence of a special venue statute, 28 U. S. C. A. §112 requires suits
involving a federal question to be brought in the district where the
defendant is an "inhabitant." The confusion which has resulted as to
where a defending unincorporated association is an "inhabitant" 20 is
avoided by the Act's explicit provisions concerning venue..
In 1902, Mr. Justice Brandeis, considered a friend of labor, declared:
"The unions should squarely take the position that they are amenable
to the law." 21 Mr. Padway testified in 1938 that labor no longer feared
being sued as an entity.22 In 1947, why do unions object to being sued
for breach of contract when only the contracting employers or other
unions may sue and only the common property of the union is subject
to execution?
A partial reason may be that unions still have an inherent fear of
lawyers and courts. This fear is not unfounded. In courts, the rights
of unions may be determined on technicalities and not on the merits of
the labor dispute. This is especially likely because presiding judges are
fully equipped to be judges in courts of law but not necessarily statesmen in the field of labor relations.
Liability for damages resulting from. wildcat 'strikes in breach of
"no-strike" clauses has been attacked by the unions on the grounds that
it imposes liability for acts beyond union control. It is a well .known
fact that unions have not always been successful in controlling the rank
and file of their members. Moreover, it may be more difficult to obtain
discipline in light of the provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act insuring
the rights of individual employees 23 and discouraging union security
agreements2 4 Although the Act expressly states that a union is "bound
by the acts of its agent" 25 and that "the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified 'shall
not be controlling," 26 the Act does not transform unions ifito insurers.
28 FFD. R. Civ. P., 4(d) (3).
1 961 STAT. -,
29 U. S.C.A.§185 (c)(Supp. 1947) (Suits may be brought
in any district court having jurisdiction of the parties. Courts shall be deemed
to have jurisdiction -of unions either in the district in which it maintains its principal office or in any district where its agents are engaged in representing employee
members.).
2' United States v. Sutherland, 74 F. 2d 89 (C. C. A. 8th 1934).
"1Address before the Economics Club of Boston, December 4, 1902.
2 See note 16, supra.
2361 STAT. , 29 U. S. C. A. §§141(b), 157, 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3),

158(b) (1), 158(b) (2), 158(b) (5), 159(a), 159(c) (1) (A).
""Id. §§158(a)(3), 158(b)(2), 158(b) (5), 159(e through h), 186(c)(4).
2 Id. §185 (b).
"Id. §§152(13), 185(e). *These sections render inapplicable the test of union
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Instead, unions, like employers, are subject to the common law rules of
agency-2'scope of employment, etc." A union member is not an
"agent" solely by virtue of his membership.2 7
In former agreements the "no-strike" provisions have been so loosely
drafted, e.g., "The Union... agrees... there shall be no strikes, walkouts, slow-downs or other interference with normal operation . . . "
that unions have apparently assumed the role of insurers. In the future
such a consequence may bd avoided by precisely defining in just which
cases the union assumes responsibility.
Some unions have advocated -refusing "no-strike" clauses, but others,
like the Boilermakers-A. F. of L., say the presence or absence of nostrike clauses is immaterial, for arbitration machinery implies an obligation not to strike. On the question of the legality of refusing to
insert a "no-strike" clause, the Senate Committee reported such a clause
28
was a point to be bargained for.
Unions are currently attempting to obtain a waiver of damage liability for breach of contract from employers. The availability of such
waivers as valid defenses to damage suits is open t6 question. In other
fields of litigation, although some courts have upheld waivers not to
sue,2 federal courts have held such waivers to be contrary to public
polity and void.30
The clauses for waiver of damage liability which unions are currently attempting to secure may possibly be distinguished from the usual
exculpation clause which confronts courts. In the first place, these
waivers'by employers are of unions' contractual liability, in contrast with
the usual exculpation clauses which waive liability for negligence. The
greatest distinction is that the parties are roughly equal in bargaining
power.3 ' According to press reports, in the Murray, the Ford and the
International Harvester agreements with the UAW-CIO, the employers agreed to a partial waiver of damage liability in consideration of
prompt specified action by the union to get wildcat strikers back on the
job plus the right to fire the strikers through an impartial umpire. Thus
the employer has traded his action for damages for uninterrupted
production.
"agents" set forth in Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 775 (March 10, 1947).
2793 CoNG. REc. 4561 (May 2, 1947).
SEx. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947).
29 Smith v. MacDonald, 37 Cal. App. 503, 174 Pac. 80 (1918); Kennon v. Sheppard, 236 Mass. 57., 127 N. E. 426 (1926).
" Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (C. C. A. 6th 1944) ; American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Anaconda, 138 F. 2d 765 (C. C. A. 5th 1943). See Tobin Quarries
v. Central Neb. Public Power and Irrigation Dist., 64 F. Supp. 200, 208 (D. C.
Neb. 1946).
"N
Note, The Signjicance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law of
Exculpation, 37 Cot. L. RE. 249 (1937).
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Furthermore, the Conference Committee deleted a provision which
made the breach of collective bargaining agreements an unfair labor
practice.3 2 From this action it might be inferred that Congress intended
redress for breach of contract to be a personal privilege rather than an
unwaivable enforcement device. Contrast the silence of the TaftHartley Act on this point with the Federal Employers' Liability Act
wherein Congress expressly declared "any contract ... to exempt [an
employer] from any liability created by this chapter ...shall be void."38
Limitation of the amount of damages may be another mode by which
labor may protect itself against the ravages of damage liability. Nothing in the Act seems to prohibit bargaining for such a clause.
In contrast with contractual liability which may be minimized or
totally avoided through bargaining, damage liability for "unlawful"
strikes and boycotts (also unfair labor practices) 3 4 may be an unwaivable enforcement device. "Whoever shall be injured in his business or
property" by an "unlawful" strike or boycott may sue the union in
either the federal courts or the state courts. The language is comparable with the Sherman Act's provision for actions for treble damages.
Although the actual damages are not augmented in the Taft-Hartley
Act, damage liability, along with administrative cease and desist orders
and court injunctions, will provide an important sanction for policing
those outlawed labor practices.
This liability may prove detrimental to labor-management relations,
if time and experience prove Congress went too far in outlawing all
secondary strikes and boycotts without attempting to distinguish those
which are unjustified from those justified by the union's "interest in a
reasonable area of economic conflict." 35
Like so many features of the Taft-Hartley Act, liability for "unlawful" strikes and boycotts is open to abuse. It may lead to a plethora
of suits against unions. An ever present and potential culprit is the
anti-union employer. He will hesitate before bringing a breach of contract suit against the union with which he bargains, 36 but he may have no
qualms about bringing vexatious suits against a union with which he has
no collective bargaining relations.
HENRY E. COLTON.
" H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
" 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §55 (1943).
3'61 STAT.- , 29 U. S. C. A. §158(b) (4) (Supp. 1947).
" It is submitted that the following cases involve boycotts of the latter type:
Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th 1908);
State v. Vail Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 49 S. E. 177 (1904).
"'The fact that no suits have been prosecuted under N. C. GENr. STAT. (1943)
§1-97(6), which apparently authorizes suits against unions, during the four years
since its enactment is indicative that employers do not lust to sue unions.
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North Carolina's Archaic Cooner System
One of the most-ancient of the common law offices to be transplanted
to America from England was that of coroner.' As the office exists in
North Carolina today there have been few changes in its functions since
its introdudion in spite of the fact that it has become antiquated and
outmoded. Some American jurisdictions, having found themselves in
a similar situation, and recognizing the inefficiency and the attendant
dangers therein, ha-e abolished the office of coroner and have replaced
it with that of medical examiner. A brief survey of our present system
as compared with the medical examiner system will, it is felt, reveal the
desirability of maldng the change in North Carolina.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

The name coroner is derived from the Latin word "a corona," which
being liberally interpreted means "for the crown," thus readily implying
the early purposes of the office. 2 Its origin is usually traced to an
ordinance of 1194,3 but the office as we know it today came into being
in 1275 when the Statute of 4 Edward I was enacted. 4 By this statute
the coroner's duties were well defined and it was recognized that he
had power to inquire into the death of any person, super visum corporis;
to investigate treasure trove, deodans, and wrecks of the sea; to pronounce judgment of outlawries; and to act for the sheriff when there
was just exception taken to that officer 5
The first law concerning coroners to be passed in the Carolina colony
was in 1715 when the General Assembly declared the Statute of 4 Edward I to be in effect within the colony." Then in 1776 the office was
made a constitutional one 7 and in 1792 the provisions of the Statute of
4 Edward I were again declared to be the law of North Carolina.8 The
North Carolina Constitution of 1868 provided for the office as it exists,
with statutory ramifications, today.9 The specific provisions of our
present statutory expression will be discussed on the following pages,
but let it be pointed out here that other than to remove treasure trove
from the coroner's jurisdiction,'0 and to transfer outlawry to the justice
of the peace," the functions of the office have changed but little since
1275.
1
18 C. J. S. 288, §2.
'I Co. INST. 30.
1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HIsT. ENG. LAW 534 (2nd. ed.).
'2 BACON ABs. 425.
14 Co. INST. 271.

'Laws of 1715, c. XI.

'N. C. CoNsT. (1776) §38.
MARTIN'S COLLrCTE STATUTES (1792) c. 49, p. 13.

N. C. CONST. Art. IV, §24.

" See

N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
to the commissioner of wrecks.
=

N. C.

GEN. STAT.

c. 82, giving authority over wrecks of the sea

(1943) §15-48.
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EEEcTION, TERM OF OFFICE, QUALIFICATION

The coroner is elected every four years and serves until a successor
is elected and qualified.' 2 He may succeed himself. Vacancies in the
office are filled by the board of county commissioners and the person so
appointed, upon qualification, holds office until his successor is elected
and qualified.' 3 He is a county official whose jurisdiction is limited to
the boundaries of the county in which he is elected, 14 and he may be
required at any time by the county commissioners of that county to
give a report, under oath, on any matters connected with his duties. 15
The coroner is not required to demonstrate any special qualifications
for election to office. There is no limitation regarding color, sex, or
occupation of candidates for the office. It is only required that he be
a voter and not fall within the disqualifications prescribed by the
Constitution.'"
Before entering on the duties of the office, the coroner must take
an oath to support the Constitution of the United States,17 the Constitution and laws of North Carolina,' 8 and to demean himself faithfully to
the duties of his office. 1 9 Should the coroner fail to take the oaths
prescribed he is subject to a penalty of five hundred dollars and may
be rejected from office by proper proceedings for that purpose. °
In North Carolina, as in all other American jurisdictions, the common law property qualification for holding office is now unknown. The
public, however, is protected by the requirement that the coroner-elect
file a bond for the faithful performance of his duties. 21 The statute
requires that the coroner give a bond, with surety, in the sum of two
ihousand dollars payable to the state and approved by the board of
county commissioners. 2 This statute, however, is considered directive
rather than mandatory, and the failure of a coroner to file a bond does
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-1.
C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§152-1, 153-9(12).
"N.
"N. C. CoNsi,. Art. IV, §24; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-1.

'IN. C.

GEN. STAT. (1943)

§153-9(10).

"'See N. C. CoNsT. Art VI, §§7 and 8; and Art. XIV, §2. The constitution

disqualifies from holding office all persons who deny the being of almighty

God;

all who have been convicted or have confessed their guilt under indictment of
treason or felony, unless their citizenship has been restored; and all who have
participated in a duel or a challenge thereto.
1"See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §11-6, as to form of oath to support the Constitution of the United States.
18 See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)

§11-7, as to form of oath to support the Con-

stitution of North Carolina.
1"N. C. CONST. Art. VI; N. C. GENo.STAT. (1943) §152-2. See N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §11-11 as to form of oath to faithfully execute duties of office.
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §128-5. However, it has been held that the taking
of the oath of office is not an indispensable criterion, for the office may exist without it. See State v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 60 (1872); State v. Patrick, 124 N. C.
651, 33 S.E. 151 (1899).
2"N. C. GENl. STAT. (1943) §152-3.
"For local modification in Yancy County reducing the required bond to 500
dollars see Session Laws of N. C. 1945, c. 271.
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not impair the validity of his- official act as de facto coroner, in reference
at least to third persons. 23 It is also provided that if the coroner presumes to discharge any duty of his office before executing the required
bond, he is liable to a forfeiture of five hundred dollars, to the use of
the state, for each attempt so to exercise his office.4 It is required
that the bond be approved, certified, registered, and filed as are sheriffs'
bonds. 25 Any person injured by the neglect, misconduct, or misbehavior in office of the coroner may bring suit against him and his
sureties upon his bond without any assignment thereof ; and the coroner
and his sureties are liable to the person injured for all acts done by
20
virtue of, or under color of his office.
A special coroner is an officer of comparatively recent origin, apparently being unknown to the common law. In North Carolina it is now
provided by statute that the clerks of the superior court have certain
emergency appointive power whenever there is a temporary or permanent vacancy in the office of coroner.2 7 This emergency appointive
power may be exercised only when the coroner is absent from the county,
or is for any reason unable to hold an inquest when necessary, or when
a vacancy in the office of coroner has not been filled by action of the
county commissioners, and, it is made to appear to the clerk that a
deceased person whose body has been found within the county probably
came to his death by criminal act or default of some person. Whenever
the clerk appoints a special coroner under any of the aforedescribed
conditions the appointee is merely required to be a "suitable person," 28
but he is vested with all the powers and duties conferred upon the
regular coroner in respect to holding inquests over dead bodies, and is
subject to the penalties and liabilities imposed upon the regular coroner
in that respect.-

PowERs- AND DuTIs
The coroner's office is partly ministerial, 80 and partly judicial in
character. 31 His principal duty is to make an investigation into every
"sudden or unnatural death" occurring within the county. 2 It is specifically provided by statute that whenever it appears that any deceased
person came to his death by the criminal act or default of some person,
2'Mabry v. Turrentine, 30 N. C. 201 (1847).
'IN.
C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §109-2.
25

N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
as to procedure for approving
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
27 N. C GEN. STAT. (1943)

§152-4;
bonds of
§109-34;
§§152-1,

see N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §153-9 (11)
county officers.
McRae 'V.Evans, 13 N. C. 383 (1830).

153-9(1).

Ibid.

N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-6.
Yeargin v. Siler, 83 N. C. 348 (1880).
't State v. Knight, 84 N. C. 790 (1881).
"Ibid. The court cited as its precedent the ancient English case of Rex. v.
Ferrand,3 B & A 260.
30

1947]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

99

the coroner must go to the body and make an investigation as to: (1)
when and how the deceased came to his death; (2) the name of the
deceased; and (3) all the mdterial circumstances attending the death.as
In this respect it is a curious fact to notice that, although the statute
requires the coroner to make an investigation whenever it appears that
34
there has been a death by criminal act or default, there is only one
specific directive in the statutes requiring any individual, public or
private, or any organization, to notify the coroner of that death. This
lack of requirement of notification coupled with the fact that there is
5
no restriction in North Carolina on removing dead bodies is obviously
a serious handicap to the efficient execution of the coroner's most important function.
If, upon making his personal investigation, the coroner is not satisfied
that death resulted from natural causes, or that no person is blamable
in any respect in connection with the death, he may call a jury and
proceed to hold an inquest.3 6 He is required to hold an inquest, regardless of his personal investigation, if an affidavit is filed with him indicating blame in connection with the death of the deceased.31 The jury
for the inquest must be composed "of six good and lawful men, freeholders, who are otherwise qualified to act as jurors, who shall not be
related to the deceased by blood or marriage, nor to any person suspected of guilt in connection with such death."' 38 The jurors are summoned by the sheriff, 9 and are sworn in the presence of the body.
After the oath has been given, and the jury has had a view of the body,
the hearing may be adjourned to other times and places and the body
of the deceased need not be present at such further hearing. 41 It is
within the power of the coroner,4 or of any juror,43 whenever he deems
it necessary to the better investigation of the cause or manner of death,
to summon a physician or surgeon to make whatever examination as
appears proper. The coroner must summon a physician even though
he does not deem it necessary if requested to do so by the solicitor of
his district, or by any member of the family of the deceased, or by
In any event, when the coroner is called
counsel for the accused.4 4
§152-7(1).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §130-80 requires the county registrar of statistics
to refer to the coroner notice of any death which has occurred without medical
attention and which he has reason to believe was due to unlawful act or neglect.
35 Op. A=. GEN. oF N. C. (March 1946).
"IN.C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-7(1).
3*Ibid.
§152-7(2).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-11.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
"0State v. Knight, 84 N. C. 790 (1881).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-8(9).
3 N. C; GEN. STAT. (1943)

8

'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§152-5, 152-7(6); Gurganious v. Simpson, 213
N. C. 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938).
,3 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-5.

"N. C. GEN.

STAT.

(1943)

§152-7(6).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

on to summon a physician, he need not do so if he is a physician or
surgeon himself, but may make the examination personally.45
The right to order an autopsy is an important incident to the coroner's duty of holding an inquest 40 and may be exercised by.him whenever either he or a majority of the coroner's jury deem it necessary to
aid them in discovering the cause of death. 47 Although it is a general
rule that the autopsy of a dead body without the consent of those entitled to its custody is a tort, the rule is inapplicable to the coroner and
his inquest. 48 However, the right to order an autopsy is subject to
certain limitations and the North Carolina statute has been interpreted
as not authorizing the coroner to order an autopsy where there is no
suspicion of foul play.49 He becomes civilly liable when he does so.W°
When an inquest is held, if it appears that any person is guilty of
any crime in connection with the death, the coroner must try to ascertain who was 'guilty, either as principal or accessory, as well as the
cause and manner of the death,51 and has the power to have summoned
any persons necessary to complete the inquiry,52 as well as to issue a
warrant for all culpable persons.5" The warrant is served by the sheriff
or other lawful officer of the county in which the dead body is found. 5
If it becomes necessary to arrest persons in another county, the coroner
of the county in which the body was found may issue his process, under
seal, to the sheriff or other lawful officer of the other county, for service.55 When the accused has been brought before the coroner the inquiry
proceeds as in the case of preliminary hearings before justices of the
peace. 56 If it appears to the coroner and the jury that the accused is
probably guilty of a capital crime he is committd to jail. 7 If it appears
that he is guilty of a lesser crime the coroner may fix his bail. 8 All
persons found probably guilty in such a hearing, and who are denied
bail by the coroner, are delivered to the keeper of the common jail by
the sheriff or other lawful officer acting at the inquest.5 9
This hearing by the coroner and his jury is held to be in lieu of
,Ibid.
48 See 18 C. J. S. 297.
'7 N. C. GrN. STAT. (1943) §90-217.
'sWEINMAN, LAW OF CORONERS AND MEDICAL ExAMINERs

(Bull. Nat. Research

Council, No. 83, 1931) 111.

"Gurganious
v. Simpson, 213 N. C. 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938).
10Id.at 616, 197 S. E. at 164.
"2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-7(3).
S N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)

" N. C. GEN.

"N.

§152-7(2).

STAT. (1943)

§152-7(4).
C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-11.

"Ibid.

See note 53 .supra.

"See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
mitment.
"See
Ibid.note 53 mupra.

§§15-125 through 15-127 for order of com-
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any other preliminary hearing and the case is immediately docketed by
the clerk of the superior court.6 0 The accused, however, is not denied
the right of habeas corpus.61 The coroner has power to require all
material witnesses, who are not themselves culpable, to enter into recognizances, with sufficient surety, to appear at the next term of the superior
court and give evidence; and he may commit to jail such witnesses who
62
refuse to recognize as directed.
Immediately upon information of a death within his county under
such circumstances as may in his own opinion necessitate an investigation, the coroner is required to notify the solicitor of his district and to
make such additional investigation as he may be directed to do by the
solicitor;63 and to permit the solicitor or any one designated by the
latter to be present at the inquest to examine and cross-examine the
witnesses.6 4 The family of the deceased and the accused person may
also have counsel present who may examine and cross-examine the witnesses. 65 However, _neither the solicitor, counsel for-the accused, nor
counsel for the family of the deceased may argue the case to the coroner's jury.6 6 The coroner may, within his discretion, exclude the
public from the hearing. 67
The statute directs the coroner to reduce to writing all the testimony
and to have each witness sign his own testimony; the coroner then
attests it with his seal.68 If the solicitor so directs, the testimony must
be taken stenographically.6 9 Here again the witnesses are required to
sign their testimony and the coroner attests their signature with his
seal. 70 However, in practice these directions are seldom carried out.70
As a general rule the proceedings before the coroner are not admissible evidence on a trial for homicide in North Carolina..' However,
it has been indicated by a dictum of the North Carolina Supreme Court
that the examination of a witness taken at a coroner's inquest would
be admissible evidence if there was proof at the trial that the witness
had died since the inquest but prior to the trial.72 This seems to indi" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-10. This is but a statutory restatement of the
common law. See CLA.x , CRIMINAL PRocEntun 88 (2nd ed. 1918).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-10.

'IN. C. GEN.

STAT.

(1943) §152-7(5).

11 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-7(7).
6"Ibid.
Ibid.
"Op. ATry. GEN. OF N. C. (May 1935).
Op. ATry. GEN. OF N. C. (September 1932).
Q7
"1N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-7(10).
'1
70 Ibid.
Ibid.
oaSee note 92 infra.
"State
7
v. Pritchett, 106 N. C. 667, 11 S.E. 357 (1890); State v. Taylor, 61
N. C. 508 (1868) ; State v. Young, 60 N. C. 126 (1863).
"'State v. Taylor, 61 N. C. 508 (1868).
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magistratea8

cate that since the coroner acts as an examining
his proceedings may be certified to the court and the testimony of a witness
taken at the inquest be used as substantive evidence, as provided by
statute, 74 where the witness has since become incapacitated by insanity
or illness, or has died, or by connivance of the defendant has removed
from the jurisdiction, and if the defendant was present at the inquest
and had an opportunity to cross-examine the disposing witness." However, the North Carolina court takes the minority view 76 in holding inadmissible the examination, even though in writing, of a witness taken
at a coroner's inquest when the witness is merely temporarily absent
from the county at the time of the subsequent trial. 77 The court has also
held inadmissible, as hearsay, testimony of an agent of a railroad company given at a coroner's inquest because given after having completed
the acts within the scope of his agency and therefore not part of the
res gestae. 78 However, it is provided by statute that testimony taken
at a coroner's inquest, if signed and attested under seal, may be received
as competent evidence in all courts for the purpose of contradiction or
corroboration of the witness who made it3°
During the inquest the accused himself may be examined, but the
examination must not be upon oath, and before it is commenced the
accused must be informed by the coroner of the charge against him and
that he is at liberty to refuse to answer questions that may be put to him,
and that his refusal to answer shall not be used to his prejudice in any
stage of the proceedings.80 If the accused is sworn81 or is not properly
cautioned, his answer on the examination cannot be used against him.8
The statute does not apply when the accused testifies at his own request,8 or when his statements are made voluntarily before the examination begins.8 4

The coroner also possesses certain police powers which he may exercise in a limited way. Thus he may act to preserve the peace by assuming the duties of the sheriff if at any time there is no person qualified
" State v. Matthews, 66 N. C. 106 (1872).
"N.

C. GEN. STAT.

(1943) §15-100.

" For elaboration of

this point see STANSwRy,

NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE

145 (1st ed. 1946).
7 40 C. J. S. 1289, §309.
" State v. Grady, 83 N. C. 643 (1880).
" Southerland v. Wilmington and Southern R. R., 106 N. C. 100 (1890) ; Henderson v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 159 N. C. 581, 75 S. E. 1092 (1912).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)

§152-8.

1o N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §15-89. Although this section as written refers
only to magistrates and makes no specific mention of coroners, the Court, in State
v. Matthews, 66 N. C. 106 (1872), construed it as extending to coroner's inquests
since the coroner acts as examining magistrate.
"' State v. Parker, 132 N. C. 1014, 43 S. E. 830 (1903) ; State v. Vaughan, 156
N. 82C.State
615, 71
S. E. 1089 (1911).
v. Matthews,
66 N. C. 106 (1872).
State v. Hawkins, 115 N. C. 712,'20 S. E. 623 (1894).
8, State v. Conrad, 95 N. C. 666 (1886).
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to act in that capacity in the county, and until some person is appointed
sheriff the coroner is vested with all the powers, penalties, and liabilities
of the office of sheriff.8 5 Or, if at any time the sheriff of a county is
interested in or a party to any court proceeding, it is proper that the
summons be addressed to and served by the coroner.8 6 Conversely, if
the coroner is interested in or a party to any proceeding and there is no
sheriff, then the clerk of the court from which the proceeding issues is
directed, by statute, to appoint some suitable person to act as special
coroner to execute the process.8 7 The words, "any proceedings in any
court," contained in the statutory provision for deputizing special officers
where the coroner and/or sheriff is interested have been given literal
interpretation and is held applicable even to courts of justices of the
88
peace as well as to the higher courts.
CRITICISM

It is believed that' the ancient and honorable office of coroner, which
has undergone so little change in this jurisdiction since the very birth
of our state, has become antiquated and outmoded by advances in both
the fields of medical science and administration of justice-advances
with which the very structure of the office has prevented it from keeping
step. This has happened in spite of legislative attempts to the contrary,
and largely because those legislative attempts have not been far reaching
enough in consequence.
The most important duty of the coroner, the investigation of deaths
in which an. element of violence or criminal neglect is suspected, is
medical in character. In medico-legal cases the necropsy, as a rule,
requires greater attention to detail than in other cases of death. In
many cases it requires a thorough knowledge of anatomy, toxicology,
zerial medica, chemistry, and in some cases microscopic or immunological studies. Pathology is especially necessary in those cases where
a considerable length of time has elapsed between the primary injury
and the fatal result. In a criticism of the office of coroner as it existed
in Texas in 1941, where many of the office's, functions were similar to
those in North Carolina today, the author 8ss used as a specific example of
the'need for scientifically trained medical examiners to take over the
medical functions of the office of coroner, those cases in which the unexplained death is a result of poisoning. In pointing out the exceedingly
85
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) -§§152-8, 162-5. However, it has been held that the
failure of the county commissioners to declare the office of sheriff vacant upon the
insanity of the occupant only authorized the coroner to perform the duties of
sheriff proper and did not cast upon him the right to collect taxes. See Somers
v. Commissioners, 123 N. C. 582, 31 S. E. 873, 68 A R 834 (1898).
'I N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-8; State v. Baird, 118 N. C. 854, 24 S. E.
668 (1896) ; Bowen v. Jones, 35 N. C. 25, 55 Am. Dec. 426 (1851).
"IN.
C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §152-8.
" Baker v. Brem, 127 N. C. 322, 37 S. E. 454 (1900).
"Lockhart, The Antiquated Office of Coroner,4 TEx. B. J. 233 (1941).
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difficult task of diagnosing poisoning he explains: "This arises from the
fact that, with the exception in most cases of corrosives (as a class) and
of strychnine, -the symptoms produced by poisons are not clearly characteristic. Even the most experienced observer cannot always with
absolute certainty distinguish the symptoms of poisoning from the symptoms of disease, and to the layman they may appear identical. There
are authentic cases where real poisoning has occurred in which the poison
given produced much the same symptomatology as a natural disease
which was epidemic at the time."8 Poisoning as a cause of death is
not alone in surrounding itself with misleading external appearances.
Others include contusions, abortions, concussions, blows to the viscera,
asphyxiation, and suffocation. Numerous more will readily occur to
the scientifically trained medical mind. Still other types of death, the
anatomical evidences of which are frequently misleading, include suspended bodies and drowning. Professor Steward in cautioning physicians assisting in post-mortems quotes a case where it was claimed'that
the deceased was drowned, but where on the third post-mortem, a bullet
which had entered the head through the opening in one of the ears,
was found in the brain, and the murderer stbsequently convicted and
executed. 0 The external appearances of shock are also deceiving, as
are wounds received after death has already occured. The difficulties
facing the coroner in the exercise of his medico-legal function are by
no means confined to the situations set out above; those are but examples of his most frequently occurring problems.
It will doubtless be argued that those difficulties have been palliated
by the statutes l in extending to the coroner and his jury the privilege
of soliciting medical assistance whenever it is deemed necessary. But,
the statute is in-effect a legislative recognition of the inefficiency of the
present system. It must be remembered that the privilege is an optional
one, the use of which i s exercised only after an investigation of the
external appearances of the deceased and the surrounding circumstances
of the death-factors which, as has already been pointed out, are misleading and deceptive. The privilege of medical assistance then, even
when utilized, is an inversion of the proper order of inquiry. Instead
of first inquiring into the death by scientific medical approach and from
the discoveries thus made, interpreting the surrounding circumstances,
the coroner examines first the surrounding circumstances and from his
layman's point of view attempts to pronounce the cause of death. Even
when a physician is called in he is all too -frequently handicapped by
inadequate facilities to properly conduct a post-mortem. The fact still
remains that the first question to be answered by the coroner's inquiry
89
Ibid.
STz WARD, LEGAL MEDICINE 84 (lst-ed.
91

N. C.

GEN. STAT.

1910).
(1943) §§152-7(6), 152-5.
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is: What was the cause of death? It is obvious that consistent accuracy
can be obtained only when the answer is given by competent, scientifically trained medical examiners, supported by all the facilities of the
medical profession.
Look now at the coroner as an administrator of justice. Once the
cause of death has been ascertained, his function becomes judicial and
with the crude machinery of his court he must decide what person, if
any, is responsible for the death. In so doing he attempts to act as a
criminal investigator, a position for which he has slight capacity due to
his inadequate skill, training, and equipment. In initiating steps for the
apprehension of the accused and in making commitments he acts as a
magistrate. All these are functions which, pertaining to the serious
matter of homicide, could best be executed by a skilled and practiced
trial lawyer. It logically follows then that the county prosecutor, whose
purpose it is to protect society against crime by the prosecution of
offenders, is the proper officer for such duties.
As the office now exists there are few of the qoroner's official acts
which do not have to be done over again or which can be done at all
without the assistance of the police and the district solicitor or his representative. It is significant that the coroner is required to notify the
solicitor whenever it appears necessary to hold an investigation; a provision apparently intended to insure that the state be represented at the
inquest by qualified legal counsel. This too is legislative recognition of
the present inefficiency of the coroner system.
The coroner's investigation is of comparatively small value in further
handling of the case other than to provide proof of death and to allow
the coroner to act as commiting magistrate. The slight use of evidence
taken at the inquest has already been indicated. Even -when allowed,
although preservation of the records of each investigation is required
by statute, practice has proved them to vary from detailed reports to
2
mere notations and they are nowhere collected or correlated.
Many important steps in the process of investigating a homicide are
left entirely to the coroner's discretion. In his discretion rests the decision as to whether an inquest is necessary or not and so there is
little to impede a coroner with improper motives from declaring an
inquest unnecessary and authorizing a speedy burial. The selection of
the jurors is left almost entirely to his discretion. As has already been
seen, the only limitations imposed on his selections are that they be freeholders, unrelated by blood or marriage to the accused and otherwise
qualified as jurors. This gives the coroner practically a free hand and
he may "pack" his jury so that the verdict will be just as he wants
it to be. This situation is certainly incongruous for it will be recalled
0" Coates, Accounting for Crime, 16 N. C. L. REv. 364 (1938).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

that the jury is regarded by law as an essential part of the inquest.
Such uncontrolled authority in the hands of any officer or office is
conducive of abuse.
It is also a regrettable fact that the coroner system, as effected in
North Carolina today, is often the victim of the less desirable features
of the American political system. In the transplantation of the English
coroner system to America its essential redeeming feature was lost when
the office was made elective and thus made subject to the whims of
politics and to the importunities of the office seeker. Professional
qualifications are freqtiintly brushed aside for political expediency, and
to the faults inherent to an anachronistic institution are added those of
an inefficient official. That the results are subversive of justice can be
denied by no one.
CONCLUSION

That the above described defects and inefficiency of the present coroner system are widely recognized wherever it is found is evidenced by
the numerous studies and criticisms that have been made throughout the
United States by both the medical and legal professions.0 3 This survey
of the North Carolina coroner system, as well as those just cited, have
all led to the inevitable conclusion that the present coroner system as
an institution of government is wholly unsuited to the needs of the
present day. That reform is readily available by abolition of the present
system and the adoption of a medical examiner plan, which would transfer the legal functions of the office to already existing agencies, has
been recognized in several progressive jurisdictions. 4
The advantages of similar action in North Carolina are apparent.
The judicial duties should be vested in the county prosecutor and the
medical duties in a medical examiner who would operate as a part of the
county health office. In this manner the best of equipment, training
and skill of both the legal and medical professions could be concentrated
on solving those problems which today are too frequently muddled be03 See Schultz and Morgan, The Coroner and the Medical Examiner (Buu..
NAT. EsEARc H CouNciL, No. 64, 1928) ; Weinnman, op. cit. supra note 48; Lockhart, op. cit. supra note 88a; Breyfogle, Law of Missouri Relating to Inquests and
Coroners;10 Mo. L. REv. 34 (1945) ; Wickersham, Should the Office of Coroner
be Abolished, 1 MINN. L. Rev. 197 (1917); STEWART, LaA. MEDICINE, C. V. (1st
ed. 1910).

" Massachusetts as early as 1877 abolished the office of coroner and created

that of medical examiner. For present status of the office in that jurisdiction see
MAss. ANN. LAWS (1944) c. 38 §§1 through 22.
The office of coroner was abolished in New York City in 1915 and the characteristic features and powers of the office were omitted by the same act in establishing the office of medical examiner. See N. Y. LAWS 1915, c. 284. Statute
upheld in In re Senior, 221 N. Y. 414, 117 N. E. 618 (1917).
Other leaders in reforming the coroner system include Maryland (see MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAws [Flack, 1939] Art, 22, §§1 through 8); and Contiecticut (see
CoNN. GEN. STAT.

1930] §§240 through 263).
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yond solution by an institution which is fatally handicapped by its own
antiquity.
The medical examiner should be appointed by the board of county
commissioners and only physicians in good standing should be eligible
for the office. As part of the county health department he would be
assured of readily accessible medical facilities, such as equipment for
microscopic examinations and chemical analysis, to assist him in his
medical examinations. In cases requiring more extended facilities, which
may not be provided by the county health office, then he should have
resort to the laboratory and clinical facilities of the departmental and
educational institutions of the state. In the thickly settled communities
of the state, where deaths and homicides are more frequent, a permanent
medical examiner would be necessary, but in the more sparsely settled
counties the county health officer himself should act as medical examiner.
Every death which occurs unattended by a physician or under suspicious
cirbumstances should be investigated immediately by the medical examiner. His notification of death should be contemporaneous with that
of the police, so far as is practical, and his investigation and report made
before the police investigation is begun. This delay in the commencement of the police investigation must of course be confined to practical
limits.
As soon as the medical examiner has completed his examination of
the corpse and made his report, the office 6f the county prosecutor should
be ready to throw all of its training, experience and professional ability
into the criminal investigation of the death, if and when the medical
examiner's report indicates that such an investigation is necessary. The
investigation in such hands would be pertinent and not subject to the
suggested inadequacies of the coroner's inquest. The coroner's jury
would be no longer necessary. The naive layman would be replaced by
expert technicians in the observation of places and persons, in discovery,
preservation and interpretation of fingerprints and other traces of human
activity, in specialized photography and in general criminal investigation.
Further, these technicians would be armed with adequate equipment for
the examination and analysis of evidences of crime such as scientific
analysis of projectiles and of ballistic imprints. Such facilities are all
now available in the State Bureau of Investigation and under the present
statute may be obtained upon request to the governor of the state.0 5 But
a slight modification of the present statute would be required to make
these facilities available to the county prosecutor in cases of homicide.
Such a move would open another avenue to the detection and restraint
of crime.
The comparison of the coroner system with the medical examiner
,5 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§114-12 through 114-18.
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plan is so greatly to the advantage of the latter that it is surprising that
the medical examiner plan has not already been adopted in North Carolina, the state which has been the Southern leader in. so much progressive legislation. The explanation probably lies in the fact that the
coroner is a part of our well established political scheme; that the entire
subject of forensic medicine is so highly technical that the layman does
not have the proper conception of its importance; and in the public
inertia toward constitutional changes. It should be remembered that
not only is the medical examiner plan overwhelmingly more efficient
than the coroner system, but that it has proven more economical
financially. 8
That the change be made cannot be too strongly urged. The North
Carolina public health program already covers ninety-two of its one
hundred counties. Part of this public health program is supported bkr
federal appropriations, it is true, but it is the opinion of the public health
authorities that the federal government will voice no objection to the
installation of the medical examiner plan as a part of the North Carolina public health system. Seventy counties already have county
prosecutors. 7 Sixty-six of these seventy counties have a public health
program. It is suggested that the medical examiner plan be put into
effect in these counties as soon as the necessary constitutional amendment can be made and that the present coroner system be continued
in the remaining thirty-four counties until adequate local provision has
been made for a change.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended:
(1) That the North Carolina Constitution be amended to abolish the
office of coroner.
(2) That the medical functions of the present coroner's office be vested
in the office of medical examiner.
(3) That the office of medical examiner be a part of the county health
organizatiori and be compensated by a salary which will attract men
of genuine scientific training and ability.
" See survey of comparative costs of the two systems by Schultz and Morgan,
supra note 93.
"'The counties are: Alamance, Anson, Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Cabarrus,
Caldwell, Carteret, Caswell, Catawba, Chatham, Chowan, Cleveland, Columbus,
Craven, Cumberland, Currituck, Dare, Davidson, Duplin, Durham, Edgecombe,
Franklin, Gates, Granville, Greene, Halifax,, Harnett, .Hertford, Hoke, Hyde,
Iredell, Johnston, Lenoir, Lincoln, Martin, McDowell, Mecklenburg, Montgomery,
Moore, Nash, New Hanover, Northampton, Onslow, Pasquotank, Pender, Perquimans, Person, Pitt, Richmond, Robeson, Rockingham, Rowan, Rutherford, Sampson, Scotland, Stanly, Surry, Tyrrell, Union, Vance, Wake, Warren, Washington,
Wayne, Wilson.
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(4) That in addition to the facilities of the county health department,
all the laboratory and clinical facilities of the educational and departmental institutions of the state be made available to the medical
examiner.
(5) That the non-medical duties of the coroner's office be vested in the
office of county prosecutor, and that the full facilities of the State
Bureau of Investigation be made available to him, when necessary,
in investigating a homicide.
JOHN R. JORDAN, JR.

LEGISLATION 1947-ESCHEATS
After the legislative summary in the June issue1 of the IzEvmw was

in press the position of the Comptroller of the Currency with reference
to the new North Carolina statute was clarified in letters from his office.
The following excerpts are of interest:
"We think that this North Carolina statute is inapplicable to
funds held by the United States in trust in the District of Columbia under the provisions of the National Bank Act, a code by
itself for winding up insolvent National banks. Such funds respond for Federal Government obligations incurred in and to be
performed in the District of Coltimbia and not for debtor obligations of National banks incurred in and to be performed in the
State where the bank was located. The Government's obligation
is evidenced in substantial part by its outstanding negotiable instruments that may be in the hands of holders for value located
in or out of North Carolina. All recognized claims are assignable.
The receiverships of National banks that became insolvent in
North Carolina have long since been closed
and no funds remain
2
for administrative or other expensesY
"... the funds necessary to respond for all claims proved to
the Comptroller's satisfaction under Title 12 U. S. C. 194 and
for delivered and undelivered dividend checks thereon are retained by the Comptroller indefinitely. Such funds cannot be
used to enlarge payments to other claimants and cannot be paid
to shareholders."3
Of the above two things may be said: (1) So far as I can learn the
practice has been to deposit funds realized from insolVent national banks
in another bank in the same city or vicinity and to draw them out to
claimants by the receiver's check on such local depository (although at
the termination of the receivership years later the remaining undisbursed
funds may be transferred to the Comptroller's credit with the U. S.
Treasury, with a Federal Reserve Bank or with some bank in the District of Columbia). It seems to me, therefore, a novel idea that the
"funds (are) held by the United States in trust in the District of Columbia," (though that might be considered as the domicile of the United
States). It is also a surprising view that the obligations-to claimants
are incurred in the District, whatever may be thought as to the place of
Survey of statutory changes, 25 N. C. L. REv. 421 (1947).
Letter of C. B. Upham, Deputy Comptroller, to L. P. McLendon, Chairman
of the Escheats Committee of the Board of Trustees of the University, May 21,
1947.
, Letter of R B. McCandless, Deputy Comptroller, to M. S. Breckenridge,
June 5, 1947.
2
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performance. (2) Since the Comptroller does not recognize the tontine
theory referred to in the note4 appearing in the June, 1947 Rnvinw to
the full extent but retains the unpaid funds "indefinitely," the administrative practice is in effect a limited escheat to the Federal Government
without specific statutory basis.
' Survey of statutory changes, 25 N. C. L. Ray. 421, 423, footnote 13 (1947).

